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THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
COLLATERAL POST-CONVICTION REVIEW
Carlos M. Vázquez* and Stephen I. Vladeck†
For years, the prevailing academic and judicial wisdom has held that,
between them, Congress and the Supreme Court have rendered postconviction habeas review all but a dead letter. But in its January 2016
decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court may have
dramatically upended that understanding in holding—for the first
time—that there are at least some cases in which the Constitution
itself creates a right to collateral post-conviction review, i.e., cases in
which a prisoner seeks to enforce retroactively a “new rule” of
substantive constitutional law under the familiar doctrine of Teague v.
Lane.
On the surface, Montgomery held only that state courts are required
to employ Teague’s retroactivity framework when and if they
adjudicate habeas petitions relying on new substantive rules of federal
law. But, in reaching that conclusion, the Court clarified that
Teague’s holding that new substantive rules of federal law are
retroactively applicable on collateral review was grounded in the
Constitution, rather than common law or the federal habeas statute—
a holding that, as we explain, was both novel and important.
We next consider which courts—state or federal—have the obligation
to provide the constitutionally required collateral review recognized
in Montgomery. Either way, the implications of Montgomery are farreaching. To conclude that the state courts must provide collateral
review would run counter to the conventional wisdom that states are
under no obligation to permit collateral attacks on convictions that
have become final. On the other hand, the conclusion that federal
courts must have jurisdiction to grant such collateral review is in
significant tension with the Madisonian Compromise. In our view, the
Supreme Court’s Supremacy Clause jurisprudence establishes that the
constitutionally required collateral remedy recognized in
Montgomery must be available, in the first instance, in state courts,
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
†

Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law.
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even if the state has not chosen to provide collateral post-conviction
relief for comparable state law claims. The state courts also have the
constitutional power and duty to afford such relief to federal
prisoners, but Congress has the power to withdraw such cases from
the state courts by giving the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over
such claims (and should be presumed to have done so). Thus, we
conclude that the state courts are constitutionally obligated to afford
collateral post-conviction review to state prisoners in the
circumstances covered by Montgomery, and the federal courts should
be presumed to have the statutory obligation to afford such review to
federal prisoners.
Finally, we examine some of the important questions raised by the
conclusion that state and federal prisoners have a constitutional right
to collateral relief. Although the questions are complex, and not all of
the answers are clear, the uncertainties surrounding some of the
contours of the remedy recognized in Montgomery should not obscure
the fact that this seemingly innocuous holding about the Supreme
Court’s appellate jurisdiction actually upends a half-century’s worth
of doctrinal and theoretical analyses of collateral post-conviction
review, a result that should have a significant impact on both
commentators’ and courts’ understanding of the relationship between
collateral post-conviction remedies and the Constitution.
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INTRODUCTION
For years, the prevailing academic and judicial wisdom has held that,
between them, Congress and the Supreme Court have rendered postconviction habeas review all but a dead letter.1 At least outwardly, the
Court’s October 2015 Term seemed to reflect that trend: not only did the
Justices side with a federal habeas petitioner in only a single case,2 but
the Court’s summary docket was once again replete with sternly worded
reversals of lower-court grants of federal habeas relief.3
On closer inspection, however, there is a far more interesting story to
tell about the October 2015 Term—one in which the Justices took an
important step towards expanding the scope of collateral post-conviction
review, and indeed towards recognizing, for the first time in the Court’s
history, that there are circumstances in which such review is
constitutionally required. This Article will explain why, in a Term
dominated by Justice Scalia’s passing and its impact, and by landmark
rulings (or non-rulings) on abortion,4 affirmative action,5 immigration,6
1
See, e.g., Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 859 (9th Cir. 2007) (Reinhardt, J., concurring
specially); Note, Suspended Justice: The Case Against 28 U.S.C. § 2255’s Statute of
Limitations, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 1090, 1090 (2016).
2
See Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016).
3
See, e.g., White v. Wheeler, 136 S. Ct. 456, 462 (2015) (per curiam) (“[T]his Court again
advises the Court of Appeals that the provisions of AEDPA apply with full force even when
reviewing a conviction and sentence imposing the death penalty.”); cf. Rapelje v. Blackston,
136 S. Ct. 388, 389–90 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (“The
Sixth Circuit seems to have acquired a taste for disregarding AEDPA. We should grant
certiorari to discourage this appetite.” (citations omitted)).
4
Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
5
Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
6
United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (mem.).
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and religious freedom,7 the most lasting constitutional and doctrinal
ramifications of the October 2015 Term may ultimately arise from the
Court’s January 2016 ruling in Montgomery v. Louisiana.8
On the surface, Montgomery is a straightforward case about the
retroactive9 effect of the Supreme Court’s 2012 ruling in Miller v.
Alabama, which had held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
mandatory life sentences without parole for juvenile offenders, even for
the crime of murder.10 Writing for a 6-3 majority in Montgomery, Justice
Kennedy had little difficulty concluding that Miller was a “substantive”
ruling under the familiar retroactivity framework of Teague v. Lane,11
and that, as such, it fell within one of the two previously recognized
exceptions to Teague’s general bar on retroactive enforcement of new
rules via habeas. Because the constitutional rule articulated in Miller
“necessarily carr[ies] a significant risk that a defendant . . . faces a
punishment that the law cannot impose upon him,”12 the Montgomery
Court held that it could be retroactively enforced through claims for
collateral post-conviction relief by prisoners whose convictions,
sentences, and direct appeals had become final before Miller was handed
down.13
In order to reach the retroactivity question, though, the Court first had
to resolve a thorny (and novel) jurisdictional issue that it had raised on
its own motion.14 Unlike most of the Supreme Court’s post-conviction
retroactivity cases, Montgomery came directly from the Louisiana state
courts, which had purported to choose, as a matter of state law, to apply

7

Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per curiam).
136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
9
As Justice Stevens cogently explained for the Court in Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S.
264, 271 & n.5 (2008), describing efforts by prisoners to take advantage of new rules of
constitutional law in terms of “retroactivity” is both confusing and misleading, given that
“the source of a ‘new rule’ is the Constitution itself, not any judicial power to create new
rules of law.” Id. at 271. To avoid even more confusion, however, we follow the
(problematic) convention throughout.
10
567 U.S. 460 (2012).
11
489 U.S. 288 (1989).
12
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734 (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352
(2004)).
13
Id. at 732–36.
14
Id. at 727.
8
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Teague in state post-conviction proceedings.15 Why didn’t that mean that
the state court’s conclusion that Miller was “procedural” (and therefore
not retroactive)16 rested upon an independent state law ground and was
therefore insulated from Supreme Court appellate review?17
One answer (which was offered by the parties in Montgomery and the
Solicitor General as an amicus curiae) might have been that, once
Louisiana chose to follow the Teague framework as a matter of state
law, an erroneous application thereof would not be “independent” of
federal law.18 But Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion rested the Court’s
jurisdiction to review the Louisiana court’s decision on a much broader
conclusion, holding that Teague imposed a mandatory constitutional
obligation on state courts to give retroactive effect in collateral postconviction proceedings to new substantive rules of constitutional law:
“[W]hen a new substantive rule of constitutional law controls the
outcome of a case, the Constitution requires state collateral review
courts to give retroactive effect to that rule.”19 As he continued,
“Teague’s conclusion establishing the retroactivity of new substantive
rules is best understood as resting upon constitutional premises. That
constitutional command is, like all federal law, binding on state
courts.”20
As this Article explains in Part I, this reading of Teague was both
novel and momentous. Jurists and commentators alike had long assumed
that, like so much else of the Supreme Court’s post-conviction habeas
jurisprudence, the Teague framework was merely an interpretation of the
federal habeas statute—and that, as such, it was only binding upon the
federal courts. The Supreme Court itself had implied as much, stating in
15

See State ex rel. Taylor v. Whitley, 606 So. 2d 1292 (La. 1992).
See State v. Tate, 130 So. 3d 829 (La. 2013).
17
See Peter W. Low et al., Federal Courts and the Law of Federal-State Relations 94 (7th
ed. 2011).
18
See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041–42 (1983). The impact of Michigan v. Long
was briefed by all sides in Montgomery. See Brief of Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae
Arguing Against Jurisdiction at 6, Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. 718 (No. 14-280); Brief of
Respondent at 8, Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. 718 (No. 14-280); Brief for Petitioner at 44,
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. 718 (No. 14-280). It was also discussed at length during oral
argument. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 14–17, Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. 718 (No. 14280).
19
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 729 (emphasis added).
20
Id.
16
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2008 that “[n]ew constitutional rules announced by this Court that place
certain kinds of primary individual conduct beyond the power of the
States to proscribe . . . must be applied in all future trials, all cases
pending on direct review, and all federal habeas corpus proceedings.”21
As Part I will demonstrate, however, Montgomery expressly extended
the applicability of the Teague exceptions to state post-conviction
proceedings—and, in the process, cemented the existence of a
reviewable federal question whenever a state court fails to apply what, in
the Supreme Court’s view, is a new rule of substantive constitutional
law applicable to the case at hand.
But, far more than confirm the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction
over state-court refusals to apply new substantive rules retroactively,
Montgomery’s reading of Teague compels the conclusion that prisoners
(both state and federal) have a federal constitutional right to enforce
retroactively new substantive rules of constitutional law (such as the one
articulated in Miller)—and that they therefore have a constitutional right
to a collateral post-conviction remedy in cases in which direct relief is
no longer available. Montgomery confirms that state prisoners (and, by
necessary implication, federal prisoners) have a right to such collateral
relief if their continued incarceration contravenes a new substantive rule
of federal constitutional law.
If the Constitution entitles state and federal prisoners to a collateral
post-conviction remedy, then either the state courts or the federal courts
must be constitutionally obligated to provide such relief. In Part II, we
consider whether the constitutionally required remedy recognized in
Montgomery is available, as a constitutional matter, in state court or in
federal court. With respect to the state courts, the conventional wisdom,
as articulated by Justice Alito in a solo concurrence in Foster v.
Chatman, another habeas case from the same Term, has long been that
“[s]tates are under no obligation to permit collateral attacks on

21
Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 266 (2008) (emphasis added). The Danforth Court
also observed that “Justice O’Connor’s opinion clearly indicates that Teague’s general rule
of nonretroactivity was an exercise of this Court’s power to interpret the federal habeas
statute.” Id. at 278. Tellingly, though, Danforth said nothing about whether the exceptions to
Teague’s general rule were also statutory—or were, instead, constitutionally compelled.

COPYRIGHT © 2017 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2017]

Constitutional Right to Collateral Review

911

convictions that have become final, and if they allow such attacks, they
are free to limit the circumstances in which claims may be relitigated.”22
With respect to the federal courts, it is widely understood to follow
from the Madisonian Compromise—that is, the Framers’ decision to
leave it to Congress to decide whether or not to create lower federal
courts—that Article III itself places no limits on Congress’s power to
restrict the jurisdiction of such courts.23 If Montgomery stands for the
proposition that either the state or the federal courts must have
jurisdiction to grant collateral relief to prisoners whose continued
incarceration contravenes a new substantive rule of federal constitutional
law, then it either refutes the conventional wisdom articulated by Justice
Alito regarding the state courts or it upends a bedrock principle of
constitutional law regarding Congress’s power to control the jurisdiction
of the lower federal courts.
Where state prisoners are concerned, we conclude that the
constitutional obligation falls on the state courts. This conclusion is
supported by two lines of cases interpreting the Supremacy Clause. The
first establishes that the state courts must entertain federal claims in the
absence of a “valid excuse,” and that a jurisdictional limitation is not a
valid excuse if it discriminates against federal law or otherwise reflects
disagreement with the policy underlying the federal law.24 As we explain
in Section II.A, any state law denying its courts jurisdiction to grant
collateral relief to prisoners who are incarcerated in contravention of a
new rule of substantive federal law would be based, at bottom, on
disagreement with the policies underlying the Constitution, as
interpreted in Montgomery.
22
Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1759 (2016) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment);
see also Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (plurality opinion) (“State collateral
proceedings are not constitutionally required as an adjunct to the state criminal proceedings
and serve a different and more limited purpose than either the trial or appeal.”);
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987) (“States have no obligation to provide
[postconviction] relief, and when they do, the fundamental fairness mandated by the Due
Process Clause does not require that the State supply a lawyer as well.” (citation omitted)).
Although Justice Alito was writing only for himself in Foster, Chief Justice Roberts, Justice
Thomas, and Justice Gorsuch recently endorsed this view. See Johnson v. Alabama, 137 S.
Ct. 2292, 2293 (2017) (mem.) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (describing state collateral review
as “purely a creature of state law that need not be provided at all”).
23
See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448–49 (1850).
24
See, e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 392–93 (1947).
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The same conclusion is supported by a separate line of Supremacy
Clause cases establishing that state laws disempowering state courts of
general jurisdiction from awarding a constitutionally required remedy do
not qualify as adequate state grounds preventing Supreme Court
review.25 These decisions rest on the premise that the state courts of
general jurisdiction must be empowered to grant constitutionally
required remedies—a category that now includes the collateral remedy
recognized in Montgomery.
Unlike state legislatures, Congress has the power to deny the state
courts jurisdiction over federal claims. It may do this by giving the
lower federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over such claims.26 It is clear,
however, that Congress has not given the federal courts exclusive
jurisdiction over collateral claims brought by state prisoners on the basis
of new rules of federal law. Indeed, Congress’s most recent legislation
on the subject, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA),27 appears to place severe limits on the federal courts’
jurisdiction to grant such relief. Although we think AEDPA should be
interpreted to authorize the federal courts to grant the constitutionally
required relief, we do not think the statute can plausibly be read to give
the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction to do so. Thus, with respect to
state prisoners, we think that, after Montgomery, the conventional
wisdom repeated by Justice Alito in Foster v. Chatman is no longer
tenable.
As Section II.B explains, the analysis with respect to federal prisoners
is more complex in light of the Supreme Court’s 1872 decision in
Tarble’s Case, and its apparent holding that state courts are
constitutionally unable to grant habeas relief to persons detained by the
federal government.28 Some have argued that it must follow that federal
courts are constitutionally empowered to grant habeas relief to persons
25

See, e.g., Gen. Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 228 (1908); see also Reich v. Collins, 513
U.S. 106, 110–13 (1994) (holding that state courts must provide remedy required by the Due
Process Clause notwithstanding “the sovereign immunity States traditionally enjoy in their
own courts”); McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 26–
31 (1990) (same).
26
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (2012).
27
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 18, 28, 40, 42,
and 50 U.S.C.).
28
Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1872).
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illegally detained by federal officials, and, indeed, that the Court so held
in Boumediene v. Bush.29 But this conclusion clashes with the
Madisonian Compromise, mentioned above. We endorse an alternative
interpretation of Tarble’s Case that reconciles it with the Madisonian
Compromise. Under this interpretation, Tarble’s Case rests on the
conclusion that Congress implicitly withdrew the state courts’
jurisdiction to grant habeas relief to federal detainees when it created
lower federal courts and gave them jurisdiction to grant such relief.30 We
argue further that Tarble’s Case and Boumediene reflect the Court’s
strong presumption that Congress would prefer that any constitutionally
required remedies against federal officials be sought in the federal courts
rather than the state courts. Accordingly, federal jurisdictional statutes
should be read to authorize the federal courts to grant such relief unless
Congress clearly expresses a desire to have such claims adjudicated in
the state courts instead.
This analysis leads us to conclude that the default forum established
by the Constitution in which to seek constitutionally required remedies
against federal officials is the state courts. But, with respect to claims by
federal prisoners, this default forum was statutorily displaced when
Congress created lower federal courts and gave them habeas jurisdiction.
Any jurisdictional limitation restricting the lower federal courts’
jurisdiction to grant a remedy should be understood to reflect Congress’s
view that the remedy in question is constitutionally optional. If the
federal courts conclude that the remedy is constitutionally required, they
should apply the presumption we have drawn from Tarble’s Case and
Boumediene and interpret the statute to authorize the lower federal
courts to award the remedy. Thus, in the absence of a clear statement by
Congress that it would prefer federal detentions to be challenged in state
court, federal courts should construe the federal habeas statutes to permit
collateral relief for federal prisoners to the extent such relief is required
by the Constitution, as construed in Montgomery.
Finally, Part III fleshes out some of the broader doctrinal implications
of our analysis in Parts I and II. Our aim is to flag some important issues
29

553 U.S. 723, 732, 745 (2008); see, e.g., Lumen N. Mulligan, Did the Madisonian
Compromise Survive Detention at Guantanamo?, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 535, 536–39 (2010).
30
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al., Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and The
Federal System 434 (7th ed. 2015) [hereinafter Hart & Wechsler] (setting forth the “implied
exclusion” reading of Tarble’s Case).
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and to offer some preliminary views rather than to discuss the issues
exhaustively.
First, what types of claims does Montgomery require to be
enforceable on collateral review? Montgomery itself involved a claim
that the prisoner’s continued incarceration contravenes a new
substantive rule of federal constitutional law. We argue in Section III.A
that the right to collateral review also attaches to the other exception to
nonretroactivity recognized in Teague—for new “watershed” rules of
criminal procedure—because, as with new substantive rules of
constitutional law, the underlying claim is that the articulation of the
new rule vitiates the prisoner’s ongoing detention. With respect to
federal prisoners, the right to collateral relief also attaches if the
defendant’s incarceration contravenes a new decision construing the
substantive scope of the statute the prisoner was convicted of violating.
A more difficult question is whether a state prisoner is
constitutionally entitled to collateral relief when the state courts
articulate a new substantive rule of state law. Answering this question
requires a deeper analysis of the constitutional basis of the Court’s
decision in Montgomery. We think the decision is based, at bottom, on
the Court’s understanding of the nature of the federal judiciary’s role in
interpreting constitutional and statutory provisions bearing on the
permissibility of primary conduct. We conclude that the Constitution
probably does not require the states to regard the role of their courts in
the same way. Accordingly, we don’t think Montgomery establishes a
general rule of retroactive applicability of new substantive rules of state
law—although it might justifiably lead state courts to interpret their own
constitutions to establish such a rule.
Second, we consider in Section III.B at what point the right to a
collateral post-conviction remedy recognized in Montgomery accrues.
Can a prisoner claim a constitutional entitlement to a collateral postconviction remedy before the Supreme Court has actually recognized a
new rule falling within Teague’s exceptions? Although Teague itself
permitted federal habeas courts to entertain a claim seeking initial
recognition of such a new rule, and although we think that state courts
should provide post-conviction remedies in such cases, we believe that,
fairly read, the Constitution does not oblige them to do so. As we
explain in Section III.B, the constitutional right to collateral relief
recognized in Montgomery arises upon the Supreme Court’s recognition
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of a new rule falling within Teague’s exception for new substantive
rules—and not before that point.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, we consider in Section III.C
the validity of a number of common procedural limitations, as applied to
the remedy recognized in Montgomery. With respect to any state statutes
of limitations, we think Montgomery requires that the clock be restarted
once the new rule is handed down by the Supreme Court. We also
believe that, notwithstanding any state rule barring second or successive
collateral post-conviction petitions, Montgomery requires federal and
state courts (with respect to federal and state prisoners, respectively) to
entertain such claims even if the claim had been considered and rejected
before the Court’s recognition of the new rule. We thus believe that
Montgomery raises substantial doubts about the validity of some of the
limits AEDPA imposes on federal prisoners’ ability to raise claims
based on new rules in a second or successive petition.
Whether states may deny relief based on procedural default rules
presents more complicated questions. Ordinarily, states may regard a
claim as procedurally defaulted if it was not raised at trial or on direct
review. Must a state waive the procedural default if the Supreme Court
recognizes the claim for the first time after the prisoner’s conviction
became final? The Supreme Court has held that federal habeas courts
should waive this sort of procedural default if the prisoner lacked the
tools with which to construct the argument at the time of his trial.31 We
think that, after Montgomery, state courts might be constitutionally
required to excuse procedural defaults under the same circumstances.
*

*

*

Lest we lose sight of the forest, though, we stress that the conclusion
that there are any circumstances in which the Constitution requires
access to collateral post-conviction review represents an enormously
important doctrinal advance, calling into question decades of
conventional scholarly and judicial wisdom, even if there remains some
uncertainty as to the specific circumstances that trigger such a
constitutional right. Moreover, recognizing the significance of
Montgomery’s jurisdictional holding should open the door to the
revisiting of any number of other assumptions about the contemporary

31

See Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16 (1984); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 130–34 (1982).
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structure of post-conviction remedies—a task that is far beyond the
scope of this Article. Instead, our goal is to explain how and why, in a
seemingly innocuous holding about the Supreme Court’s appellate
jurisdiction, Montgomery upends a half-century’s worth of doctrinal and
theoretical analyses of collateral post-conviction review, a result that
could have a significant impact on both commentators’ and courts’
understanding of the relationship between collateral post-conviction
remedies and the Constitution.
I. THE SOURCE OF THE REMEDY FOR “NEW RULES”:
FROM TEAGUE TO MONTGOMERY
To understand the significance of Montgomery’s jurisdictional
holding, it is important to situate that decision against the backdrop of
the Supreme Court’s evolving approach to retroactivity over the past
half-century. This evolution was triggered by the Warren Court’s
invigoration and incorporation of myriad new constitutional protections
in criminal proceedings in the 1960s, which in turn raised complex
questions about whether (and when) prisoners already convicted could
avail themselves of such “new rules.”32
Before 1965, the Court had allowed all new rules to be retroactively
enforced on direct and collateral review alike.33 But as the Justices
applied the exclusionary rule to the states,34 recognized a right to counsel
in all criminal cases,35 articulated prophylactic rules limiting custodial
interrogations,36 and so on, they sought to moderate the impact of their
jurisprudence by limiting the circumstances in which these new rulings
could be applied to judicial proceedings that predated them. After some
clumsy first steps,37 a majority eventually coalesced around a threefactor test for when a new rule would apply retroactively, turning on (1)
32
See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 30, at 1293 (“The retroactivity question grew in
significance during the 1960s as a result of . . . the Warren Court, and that Court’s broad and
novel criminal procedure decisions, of which Miranda is an example.”).
33
See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 272 (2008); see also id. at 293 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
34
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 643 (1961).
35
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 335 (1963).
36
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 436–37 (1966).
37
See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 618–19 (1965).
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the purpose of the new rule; (2) the extent of reliance on the old rule;
and (3) the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive
application of the new rule.38 But the Court never explained (perhaps
because it could not agree upon) where these factors came from, or the
textual source of the imperative that new rules satisfying these factors
must be retroactively enforceable.
And, critically for present purposes, the Warren Court’s
understanding of retroactivity did not differentiate between direct
appeals and collateral post-conviction review. As long as the three
factors summarized in Stovall v. Denno militated in favor of retroactive
application, the new rule would apply to all cases on both direct and
collateral post-conviction review. Thus, the specific nature of the “new
rule,” rather than the difference between direct appeals and collateral
post-conviction review, was central to the applicability of that rule under
the Warren Court’s framework.
A. Justice Harlan and the Teague Framework
The Court’s current approach to retroactivity has its roots in
concurring opinions of the second Justice Harlan, who forcefully argued
that the distinction between direct and collateral review was of central
importance. As he explained in separate opinions in Desist v. United
States39 and Mackey v. United States,40 so long as a direct appeal was
pending, application of a “new rule” wasn’t ever truly retroactive, since
courts (including appellate courts) had an obligation (perhaps grounded
in the Constitution) to resolve the case before them based on then-extant
law.41 Collateral post-conviction review was different, Harlan argued,
because it was an extraordinary remedy in which no such obligation
existed, and because countervailing principles of comity and finality
dictated at least some deference to the underlying (and completed)
criminal proceeding.42 Thus, as he explained in Mackey, new rules
should generally not be enforceable through collateral post-conviction
review.
38

See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967).
394 U.S. 244, 256–69 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
40
401 U.S. 667, 675–702 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
41
See, e.g., id. at 679.
42
See id. at 681–702.
39
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At the same time, though, Justice Harlan agreed that there should be
two circumstances in which new rules could—and, indeed, should—be
retroactively enforceable even through actions seeking collateral postconviction relief:
First, . . . those [new rules] that place, as a matter of constitutional
interpretation, certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct
beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe,
must . . . be placed on a different footing . . . because [they]
represent[] the clearest instance where finality interests should yield.
There is little societal interest in permitting the criminal process to rest
at a point where it ought properly never to repose. . . . Thus, the
obvious interest in freeing individuals from punishment for conduct
that is constitutionally protected seems . . . sufficiently substantial to
justify applying current notions of substantive due process to petitions
for habeas corpus.
Secondly, I think the writ ought always to lie for claims of
nonobservance of those procedures that . . . are “implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty.” . . . [where] time and growth in social
capacity, as well as judicial perceptions of what we can rightly
demand of the adjudicatory process, will properly alter our
understanding of the bedrock procedural elements that must be found
to vitiate the fairness of a particular conviction.43

In other words, the Harlan approach would have allowed for collateral
enforcement of new rules either when the rule vitiates the substantive
basis for the defendant’s conviction (or sentence), or when it is so
fundamental to the procedural fairness of the proceeding that the trial
court’s failure to have observed it warrants the conclusion that the
conviction is not just voidable, but void. Although Harlan marshalled
numerous examples of the former, the only example he offered of the
latter was the right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants
recognized in Gideon v. Wainwright.44
Most importantly for present purposes, neither of Harlan’s lengthy
discussions of his proposed retroactivity framework explained the

43
44

Id. at 692–93 (citations and footnotes omitted).
See id. at 694 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 349 (1963)).
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source of the two exceptions—and whether they were a creature of
statute (or federal common law), or might instead, like the enforceability
of new rules on direct appeal, be constitutionally compelled. The only
hint Harlan provided was that the task before the Court was to “resettl[e]
the limits of the reach of the Great Writ,”45 without clarifying whether
he meant the Great Writ enshrined in the Constitution, or the one
Congress had provided by statute beginning with the Judiciary Act of
1789.46
The Supreme Court took a decisive step toward embracing Harlan’s
framework in Griffith v. Kentucky, holding that new rules should be
fully retroactive on direct review, whether or not they satisfied the
Stovall approach.47 Two years later, in Teague v. Lane, the Court
embraced the other half of Harlan’s framework, holding that new rules
generally are not retroactively enforceable through collateral postconviction review, unless they fall within one of Harlan’s two
exceptions.48 As Justice O’Connor wrote for a four-Justice plurality:49
Application of constitutional rules not in existence at the time a
conviction became final seriously undermines the principle of finality
which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system.
Without finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent
effect. The fact that life and liberty are at stake in criminal
prosecutions “shows only that conventional notions of finality should
not have as much place in criminal as in civil litigation, not that they
should have none.”50

45

Id. at 701–02.
On the neglected significance of the divergence between the constitutional (“commonlaw”) writ and its “chimerical statutory twin,” see Stephen I. Vladeck, The New Habeas
Revisionism, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 941, 978–87 (2011) (reviewing Paul D. Halliday, Habeas
Corpus: From England to Empire (2010)).
47
479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987).
48
489 U.S. 288, 305–07 (1989). The Teague Court explained that it adopted the second
exception “with a modification,” reading it to encompass even fewer rules of criminal
procedure than Justice Harlan had likely meant. See id. at 311–12.
49
Although Teague itself only commanded four votes on the relevant holdings, subsequent
majorities of the Court have routinely endorsed and relied upon it. See Hart & Wechsler,
supra note 30, at 1295.
50
Teague, 489 U.S. at 309 (quoting Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral
Attacks on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 150 (1970)).
46
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Teague thereby embraced the rest of Justice Harlan’s retroactivity
framework51—endorsing, but shedding no further light on the source of
the exceptions Justice Harlan had outlined in Mackey.52 And although
Justice Brennan’s dissent argued that Justice O’Connor’s opinion was
based on a misreading of the federal habeas statute (and in any event
failed to honor the strong presumption in favor of stare decisis in nonconstitutional cases),53 Justice White’s concurrence was more equivocal
on the source of Justice Harlan’s framework, cryptically noting that
some aspects of the Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence “appear to have
constitutional underpinnings.”54
B. The Debate Over Teague’s Exceptions
Teague’s silence as to the provenance of its exceptions—and whether
they were grounded in the habeas statute, federal common law, or the
Constitution—remained in the background, as most of the academic and
judicial commentary on the decision focused on its adoption of the
underlying nonretroactivity framework and its broad reading of what
constitutes a “new rule.”55 After all, whether Teague’s exceptions
derived from the federal habeas statute or the Constitution made no
difference to federal courts; either way, they provided a basis for relief

51
Teague quietly departs from Harlan’s framework in one crucial respect (albeit one that
is not material here), for its definition of when a Supreme Court decision is a “new rule”—
when “the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s
conviction became final”—is much more capacious than anything Harlan suggested in
Desist or Mackey, and has the effect of triggering the retroactivity framework in a far greater
number of cases. Id. at 301 (emphasis omitted); see also supra note 48 (noting that the Court
in Teague modified Harlan’s second exception).
52
Teague, 489 U.S. at 310 (“[W]e now adopt Justice Harlan’s view of retroactivity for
cases on collateral review. Unless they fall within an exception to the general rule, new
constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have
become final before the new rules are announced.”).
53
See id. at 326–27, 332–33 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
54
Id. at 317 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
55
For just a sampling of the voluminous literature on Teague, see the sources cited in Hart
& Wechsler, supra note 30, at 1299–1300 & nn.7–8. See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr. &
Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 Harv. L.
Rev. 1731, 1738–44 (1991).
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on the merits in cases to which they applied.56 And, until Congress
dramatically scaled back the scope of federal post-conviction habeas
review in AEDPA, there was little need for state prisoners to resort to
state collateral post-conviction proceedings to take advantage of new
rules of federal constitutional law—federal courts generally provided a
much better forum.
In several respects, AEDPA put new pressure on the Teague
framework. First, it introduced a one-year statute of limitations for all
federal post-conviction habeas cases.57 Second, it dramatically raised the
bar for second-or-successive federal habeas petitioners to take advantage
of new rules, barring courts of appeals from even authorizing the pursuit
of such claims (let alone reaching the merits thereof) unless and until the
new rule at issue had already been “made retroactive to cases on
collateral review by the Supreme Court.”58 Third, and more generally,
AEDPA’s constraints on the substantive scope of federal habeas relief
created both formal and informal pressures on state collateral postconviction proceedings, raising the question Teague had not answered as
to how its retroactivity framework should apply in such cases.59
How the Supreme Court itself applied Teague may also have put
pressure on its framework, as the Court repeatedly refused to hold that
decisions articulating major new constitutional procedural protections in
criminal cases (such as Ring v. Arizona,60 Crawford v. Washington,61 and
Padilla v. Kentucky62) satisfied the second of Justice Harlan’s

56
For a rare exception—and a pre-AEDPA look at Teague’s impact on state postconviction proceedings—see Mary C. Hutton, Retroactivity in the States: The Impact of
Teague v. Lane on State Postconviction Remedies, 44 Ala. L. Rev. 421 (1993).
57
See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2012) (state prisoners); id. § 2255(f) (federal prisoners).
58
See id. § 2244(b)(2)(A) (state prisoners); id. § 2255(h)(2) (federal prisoners). See
generally Stephen I. Vladeck, Using the Supreme Court’s Original Habeas Jurisdiction To
“Ma[k]e” New Rules Retroactive, 28 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 225 (2016).
59
Outside the context of Teague, AEDPA’s narrowing of the scope of federal postconviction habeas has had an even greater impact on state post-conviction proceedings,
leading to the rise of what some have called “the new state postconviction.” See Giovanna
Shay, The New State Postconviction, 46 Akron L. Rev. 473 (2013).
60
536 U.S. 584 (2002).
61
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
62
559 U.S. 356 (2010).
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exceptions—for “watershed” rules of criminal procedure.63 Unable to
enforce these new rules retroactively in federal habeas petitions,
prisoners turned to state collateral post-conviction proceedings, forcing
the question of how Teague’s nonretroactivity regime applied in the
state courts—if at all.
The Supreme Court answered that question in part in Danforth v.
Minnesota,64 holding that states are free to apply new rules retroactively
even when such rules do not fall within the Teague exceptions. To reach
this result, Danforth split Teague’s framework into two: the general bar
against retroactive enforcement of new rules via collateral postconviction review, and the specific exceptions first identified by Justice
Harlan. As Justice Stevens explained, “the case before us now does not
involve either of the ‘Teague exceptions.’”65 Instead, it raised only
Teague’s “general rule of nonretroactivity,” which “was an exercise of
this Court’s power to interpret the federal habeas statute.”66 And because
the federal habeas statute only applies to federal habeas petitions,
Teague’s general rule of nonretroactivity did not bind state courts.67
But, with one exception,68 Justice Stevens’s majority opinion in
Danforth was careful to limit itself to what it called Teague’s “general
rule,” and to leave open whether Teague’s “exceptions” were also not
binding upon state courts. So understood, Danforth left states free to
apply retroactively even those new rules that did not fall into one of the
Teague exceptions (and so were not retroactive under Teague). But the
Court left open whether states could decline to apply retroactively those
new rules that did fall into a Teague exception (and so were retroactive
under Teague).

63

See Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342, 344 (2013) (Padilla not retroactive);
Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 409 (2007) (Crawford not retroactive); Schriro v.
Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 349 (2004) (Ring not retroactive).
64
552 U.S. 264, 266 (2008).
65
Id. at 277.
66
Id. at 278.
67
Id. at 278–79.
68
The very first sentence of the Danforth majority opinion explained, perhaps inartfully,
that “[n]ew constitutional rules announced by this Court that place certain kinds of primary
individual conduct beyond the power of the States to proscribe, as well as ‘watershed’ rules
of criminal procedure, must be applied in all future trials, all cases pending on direct review,
and all federal habeas corpus proceedings.” Id. at 266 (emphasis added).
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C. The Significance of Montgomery
That exact fact pattern presented itself in Montgomery, in which a
state prisoner sought to avail himself of the Supreme Court’s 2012
decision in Miller v. Alabama—which had held that the Eighth
Amendment forbids the imposition upon a juvenile offender of a
mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole, even for
murder.69 Although Louisiana’s state courts had chosen to follow the
Teague framework in state post-conviction proceedings as a matter of
state law,70 they had also held prior to Montgomery’s case that Miller
did not fall within the first Teague exception71—and therefore could not
be retroactively enforced via collateral post-conviction review.72
Montgomery’s application for collateral state post-conviction relief
under Miller was therefore denied, a decision from which he petitioned
for certiorari.
At the certiorari stage, neither Montgomery nor Louisiana raised
concerns about the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to review the state
court’s application of Teague. Instead, the Court raised the issue sua
sponte when it granted review, adding the jurisdictional question to the
grant and appointing an amicus curiae to take the adverse position.73 The
core of the amicus’s argument in opposition to jurisdiction was the view
that the entire Teague framework—including the exceptions—was a
construction of the federal habeas statute, and that any doubt on that
point was settled in Danforth. Thus, he argued, “The federal habeas
statute supplied the exclusive source of the Teague exceptions to
finality,”74 and “Danforth’s rationale explains that Teague’s exceptions
69

See 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012).
See Taylor v. Whitley, 606 So. 2d 1292, 1296 (La. 1992).
71
To be sure, Louisiana was not an outlier; by the time the Court granted certiorari, the
question of Miller’s retroactivity had produced a remarkable 23-20 split in lower-court
authority—with 11 state and 12 federal cases holding it to be nonretroactive, and 12 state
and 8 federal cases holding it to be retroactive. See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 1,
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. 718 (No. 14-280).
72
See State v. Tate, 130 So. 3d 829, 844 (La. 2013).
73
See Montgomery, 135 S. Ct. 1546 (2015) (mem.); see also Jason M. Zarrow & William
H. Milliken, Retroactivity, the Due Process Clause, and the Federal Question in Montgomery
v. Louisiana, 68 Stan. L. Rev. Online 42, 44–45 (2015) (summarizing the jurisdictional issue
shortly after the grant of certiorari).
74
Brief of Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae Arguing Against Jurisdiction at 23,
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. 718 (No. 14-280).
70
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to finality are based on the federal habeas statute.”75 Neither of these
statements is correct; as discussed above, Teague implicitly and
Danforth explicitly avoided saying anything about the source of the
exceptions to Teague, as opposed to the general rule of nonretroactivity.
That does not resolve the jurisdictional question against the amicus; it
merely suggests that it was a matter of first impression in Montgomery.
Any doubt on that point was quickly put to rest by Justice Kennedy
(one of the two dissenters in Danforth),76 who opened the majority
opinion in Montgomery by explaining why the answer to the
jurisdictional question was not foreordained:
Neither Teague nor Danforth had reason to address whether States are
required as a constitutional matter to give retroactive effect to new
substantive or watershed procedural rules. Teague originated in a
federal, not state, habeas proceeding; so it had no particular reason to
discuss whether any part of its holding was required by the
Constitution in addition to the federal habeas statute. And Danforth
held only that Teague’s general rule of nonretroactivity was an
interpretation of the federal habeas statute and does not prevent States
from providing greater relief in their own collateral review courts. The
Danforth majority limited its analysis to Teague’s general retroactivity
bar, leaving open the question whether Teague’s two exceptions are
binding on the States as a matter of constitutional law.77

Turning to the question Danforth “left open,” Montgomery held that
“when a new substantive rule of constitutional law controls the outcome
of a case, the Constitution requires state collateral review courts to give
retroactive effect to that rule.”78 This was so, Justice Kennedy explained,
because “[s]ubstantive rules . . . set forth categorical constitutional
guarantees that place certain criminal laws and punishments altogether
beyond the State’s power to impose. It follows that when a State
enforces a proscription or penalty barred by the Constitution, the

75

Id. at 24.
The other Danforth dissenter—Chief Justice Roberts—joined Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion in Montgomery.
77
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 728–29.
78
Id. at 729 (emphasis added).
76
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resulting conviction or sentence is, by definition, unlawful.”79 Nor did it
make a difference if the state enforcement is “retroactive”: “A penalty
imposed pursuant to an unconstitutional law is no less void because the
prisoner’s sentence became final before the law was held
unconstitutional. There is no grandfather clause that permits States to
enforce punishments the Constitution forbids. To conclude otherwise
would undercut the Constitution’s substantive guarantees.”80
Finally, as Justice Kennedy concluded, “[i]f a State may not
constitutionally insist that a prisoner remain in jail on federal habeas
review, it may not constitutionally insist on the same result in its own
postconviction proceedings,”81 without running afoul of the Supremacy
Clause. Thus, “[w]here state collateral review proceedings permit
prisoners to challenge the lawfulness of their confinement, States cannot
refuse to give retroactive effect to a substantive constitutional right that
determines the outcome of that challenge.”82 Because Louisiana had
opened its courts to such challenges, the Supreme Court had jurisdiction
to review the state courts’ refusal to apply Miller retroactively (and,
ultimately, to reverse that holding).83
In what would turn out to be his very last opinion,84 Justice Scalia
(joined in full by Justices Thomas and Alito) dissented on both the
jurisdictional question and the merits, arguing with respect to the former
that “[n]either Teague nor its exceptions are constitutionally
compelled. . . . Any relief a prisoner might receive in a state court after
finality is a matter of grace, not constitutional prescription.”85 The
majority’s contrary conclusion, Justice Scalia objected, would not only

79

Id. at 729–30.
Id. at 731.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 731–32.
83
Technically, the Court could have resolved the jurisdictional question without
identifying the source of the right. As we noted above, the mere fact that Louisiana had
adopted the Teague framework was arguably enough to establish that the state ground was
not independent. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
84
Montgomery was one of four decisions in argued cases handed down on January 25,
2016—the last time the Court issued such rulings before Justice Scalia’s passing. And
because Justice Kennedy was the senior Justice among the authors of the four majority
opinions, Montgomery was announced from the bench (and released to the public) last.
85
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 739 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
80
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impose an unprecedented obligation upon state courts, but upon federal
courts as well, since recognition that Teague’s exceptions were
grounded in the Constitution would deprive Congress of the power “to
do away with Teague’s exceptions altogether.”86 “Until today,” Justice
Scalia concluded, “no federal court was constitutionally obliged to grant
relief for the past violation of a newly announced substantive rule.”87
In light of Justice Scalia’s dissent (and the brief of the Courtappointed amicus), it would be difficult to accuse the Montgomery
majority of missing the significance of its jurisdictional analysis. The
amicus presented the Court with a choice between grounding Teague’s
exceptions in the federal habeas statute or the Constitution, and Justice
Scalia’s dissent highlighted the consequences—for both state and
federal courts—of the majority’s holding that Teague’s exceptions
derive directly from the Constitution. Moreover, both Montgomery and
Louisiana (and the United States, as amicus curiae) had offered a
narrower ground for jurisdiction—that the state law ground was not truly
“independent,” since it was interwoven with federal law. Thus, the Court
in Montgomery consciously rested its jurisdictional holding on broader
grounds than may have been strictly necessary, with full awareness of
the fact that it was constitutionalizing Teague’s exceptions. What it may
not have fully appreciated, as we explain in Part II, is just how farreaching the consequences of that result necessarily are.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALLY COMPELLED JUDICIAL FORUM
As discussed in Part I, the Court in Montgomery held that state (and,
necessarily, federal) prisoners have a right not to be incarcerated in
contravention of new substantive rules of federal constitutional law, and
that this right itself has a constitutional basis. It follows that either state
or federal courts, or both, have a constitutional obligation to entertain
prisoners’ collateral claims that their continued incarceration
contravenes new substantive rules initially recognized after the
conclusion of their direct appeals. This Part considers whether the
Constitution imposes this obligation on the state courts or the federal
courts, or both.

86
87

Id. at 741.
Id.
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Before addressing that question, we briefly consider another
possibility: that both federal and state courts have an obligation to
provide collateral review and grant collateral relief to prisoners whose
continued incarceration contravenes a new substantive rule of
constitutional law only if they have been given jurisdiction to entertain
collateral claims under state or federal statutes. We believe this
possibility is precluded by the Constitution. We do not claim that the
principle invoked by the Court in Marbury v. Madison, that for every
violation of a legal right there must be a remedy,88 is an unyielding one.
We agree with Professors Fallon and Meltzer that this principle is “not
an ironclad rule, and [that] its ideal is not always attained.”89 Indeed, as
Fallon and Meltzer have argued, Teague itself exemplifies the limits of
this principle insofar as it denies a collateral remedy for convictions that
contravene most new rules of constitutional law.90 But, as the Court
confirmed in Montgomery, the Constitution does require a collateral
remedy for persons incarcerated in contravention of a new substantive
rule of constitutional law.
The question here is not whether the Constitution requires a remedy
for the violation of a constitutional right. It is, rather, whether the
Constitution requires a judicial forum for the enforcement of an
affirmative remedy the Supreme Court has now held (in Montgomery) to
be constitutionally required. When the Constitution requires a remedy
for the ongoing violation of a constitutional right involving individual
liberty, we believe that the Constitution requires that some court be
available to provide the remedy. The “necessity” of the conclusion
reached by the Court in General Oil Co. v. Crain is equally applicable
here: “If a [constitutionally required remedy] is precluded in the national
courts . . . and may be forbidden by a state to its courts, . . . it must be
evident that an easy way is open to prevent the enforcement of many
provisions of the Constitution.”91
In this Part, we consider whether the constitutional remedy to which
persons incarcerated in contravention of new substantive rules of
constitutional law are entitled is available, as a constitutional matter, in
88

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 54, at 1778.
90
See id. at 1807–20.
91
209 U.S. 211, 226 (1908).
89
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the state courts or in the federal courts. We consider this issue separately
for two categories of prisoners: those in state custody and those in
federal custody.
A. State Prisoners
In Montgomery, the Court did not have to decide whether the
Louisiana state courts were constitutionally obligated to provide a forum
in which state prisoners could seek collateral post-conviction relief on
the basis of new substantive rules of constitutional law. As noted above,
Louisiana did allow state prisoners to obtain collateral review of their
convictions for consistency with federal law. For this reason, the Court
in Montgomery could limit itself to holding that, “[i]f a state collateral
proceeding is open to a claim controlled by federal law, the state court
‘has a duty to grant the relief that federal law requires.’”92 As to whether
states are constitutionally required to open their courts to collateral
claims by state prisoners, the conventional view has long been the one
expressed by Justice Alito in Foster v. Chatman: “States are under no
obligation to permit collateral attacks on convictions that have become
final, and if they allow such attacks, they are free to limit the
circumstances in which claims may be relitigated.”93
Whether state prisoners have a right to collateral relief based on new
rules in federal courts under current statutes is highly uncertain. Under
the revisions to the habeas statute enacted in 1996 as part of AEDPA, a
state prisoner may not obtain collateral relief in the federal courts unless
the state court’s “adjudication of the claim . . . resulted in a decision that
was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
92

Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 731 (quoting Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211, 218 (1988)).
136 S. Ct. 1737, 1759 (2016) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Murray v.
Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (plurality opinion) (“State collateral proceedings are not
constitutionally required as an adjunct to the state criminal proceedings and serve a different
and more limited purpose than either the trial or appeal.”); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S.
551, 557 (1987) (“States have no obligation to provide [postconviction] relief, and when
they do, the fundamental fairness mandated by the Due Process Clause does not require that
the State supply a lawyer as well.” (citation omitted)). As noted above, see supra note 22,
Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, and Justice Gorsuch now appear to agree with this
view. See Johnson v. Alabama, 137 S. Ct. 2292, 2293 (2017) (mem.) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (describing state collateral review as “purely a creature of state law that need not
be provided at all”).
93

COPYRIGHT © 2017 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2017]

Constitutional Right to Collateral Review

929

United States.”94 The statute thus does not appear to permit relief on the
basis of any rules that were recognized by the Supreme Court after the
conviction.95 To be sure, there are plausible grounds for exempting
claims falling within the two Teague exceptions from this section as a
matter of statutory interpretation. Thus far, though, the Court has noted
the issue but not resolved it.96
Unless the Court reads such an exemption into Section 2254(d)(1),
AEDPA raises the constitutional issue addressed in this Part. If AEDPA
does not preserve federal habeas review of state convictions for
consistency with new substantive rules of constitutional law, and if
Justice Alito is right about the freedom of states to close their courts to
collateral claims, then some state prisoners may find themselves with no
judicial forum in which to seek the remedy the Court in Montgomery
held was constitutionally required. Either AEDPA is unconstitutional in
this regard or the state courts are constitutionally required to afford
collateral relief to persons incarcerated in contravention of new
substantive rules of federal constitutional law.
In our view, the constitutionally required forum for the remedy the
Court recognized in Montgomery is the state courts. This conclusion is
supported by the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding the obligations of
the states under the Supremacy Clause to provide a forum for the
adjudication of federal claims, as well as by decisions holding that state
laws denying their courts the jurisdiction to grant a constitutionally
required remedy do not constitute an adequate state ground barring
direct review of a state court decision in the Supreme Court. Congress
can confer such authority on the federal courts, and can make the federal
courts’ jurisdiction over such claims exclusive. But unless and until it

94

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012).
This provision applies only to claims that were “adjudicated on the merits in State court
proceedings.” Id. If the claim was not adjudicated on the merits in the state courts, it is likely
that the claim was procedurally defaulted. Although there may be some claims that were not
adjudicated on the merits in state courts yet were not procedurally defaulted, the number of
such claims is likely very small. In any event, the text of § 2254(d)(1) appears to permit
claims based on new rules of constitutional law only if they were not adjudicated in state
court and if there was both cause and prejudice to excuse the prisoner’s default. On the
“cause and prejudice” standard, see Hart & Wechsler, supra note 30, at 1337–45.
96
See Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 39 n.* (2011).
95
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has done so, the state courts have both the power and the obligation to
entertain such claims.
1. Collateral Relief for State Prisoners in State Court
Contrary to the conventional wisdom repeated by Justice Alito in
Foster v. Chatman, states are not entirely “free to limit the
circumstances” in which their courts are open to collateral review of
criminal convictions.97 In Montgomery, the Court held that, at a
minimum, “[i]f a state collateral proceeding is open to a claim controlled
by federal law, the state court ‘has a duty to grant the relief that federal
law requires.’”98 Settled precedent further establishes that states are not
free to close their courts to collateral claims based on federal law.
a. The Testa Line of Cases
First, and most narrowly, it is clear that, once a state opens its
courthouse doors to particular classes of claims, it cannot discriminate
against federal claims. This nondiscrimination feature of the Supremacy
Clause, recognized in such cases as McKnett v. St. Louis & San
Francisco R.R. Co.99 and Testa v. Katt,100 has been generally accepted by
the Court (with the exception of Justice Thomas).101 Thus, if a state
permits collateral review of state criminal convictions on the ground that
the conviction contravened state constitutional law principles, then, at a
minimum, the state courts must be equally open to collateral relief based
97

See supra note 22.
136 S. Ct. 718, 731 (2016) (quoting Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211, 218 (1988)).
99
292 U.S. 230 (1934).
100
330 U.S. 386 (1947).
101
In Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 742 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting), Justice
Thomas, in a portion of his opinion in which he wrote only for himself, maintained that state
jurisdictional limits are valid even if they discriminate against federal claims. In the portion
of the opinion joined by the other dissenting Justices, he argued that state jurisdictional
limits are valid so long as they do not discriminate against federal claims. See id. at 775.
The Virginia Supreme Court appears to have overlooked this nondiscrimination principle
in a recent decision by holding that a new substantive rule of federal law cannot be raised via
a motion to vacate a sentence because a motion to vacate “is not a state collateral-review
proceeding ‘open to a claim controlled by federal law,’” even though such motions are
available in Virginia to correct a sentence that contravenes a state statute. Jones v.
Commonwealth, 795 S.E.2d 705, 719 (Va. 2017) (quoting Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 731–
32), petition for cert. filed, No. 16-1337 (U.S. May 3, 2017).
98
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on analogous principles of federal constitutional law. State jurisdictional
limits may be relied on as a “valid excuse” for declining to entertain a
federal claim,102 but a rule that discriminates against federal law is not a
valid excuse.
In the view of the other Justices who dissented in Haywood, this
nondiscrimination principle is the only limit imposed by the Supremacy
Clause on the states’ ability to exclude federal claims from the
jurisdiction of their courts.103 On this view, the constitutional inquiry
would focus on whether the state courts have jurisdiction over
“analogous” state law claims. What would count as an analogous state
law claim for the other Haywood dissenters is not entirely clear. Would
a state court be required to entertain a collateral claim based on a “new”
substantive rule of federal constitutional law if it has jurisdiction over
any state constitutional claim? Or would it have to entertain such a claim
only if its courts are open to collateral review of “new” substantive rules
of state constitutional law? What if the state does not recognize the
retroactive effect of new state rules of substantive law?
The Court obviated these questions in Haywood v. Drown. At issue in
Haywood was New York legislation that converted all scope-ofemployment damages claims against state corrections officers into
claims against the state itself. Given that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has been
interpreted by the Supreme Court not to create a right of action against
states, the (unintentional) result of the New York law was to foreclose
state-court jurisdiction over § 1983 damages claims against corrections
officers. The state argued that its legislation (enacted before the
Supreme Court foreclosed § 1983 suits against states) was neutral, and
thus a “valid excuse” for dismissing the § 1983 claim. The Court
rejected the argument, however, holding that “[e]nsuring equality of
treatment is . . . the beginning, not the end, of the Supremacy Clause
analysis.”104 “Although the absence of discrimination is necessary to our
finding a state law neutral, it is not sufficient.”105 “[E]quality of
treatment does not ensure that a state law will be deemed a neutral rule
102

See Testa, 330 U.S. at 392–93 (quoting Douglas v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R.,
279 U.S. 377, 388 (1929)).
103
See Haywood, 556 U.S. at 775 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
104
Id. at 739 (majority opinion).
105
Id.
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of judicial administration and therefore a valid excuse for refusing to
entertain a federal cause of action.”106
The foregoing statements in Haywood suggest that the Supremacy
Clause does more than simply bar discrimination against federal claims.
But the Court was equivocal about whether a state court’s obligation to
entertain a federal claim turns on whether it has jurisdiction over
“analogous” state-law claims. In holding that the New York
jurisdictional limitation contravened the Supremacy Clause, the Court
stated that the case “[did] not require [it] to decide whether Congress
may compel a State to offer a forum, otherwise unavailable under state
law, to hear suits brought pursuant to § 1983.”107 “New York has made
this inquiry unnecessary by creating courts of general jurisdiction that
routinely sit to hear analogous § 1983 actions.”108 As the Court
described its holding: “[H]aving made the decision to create courts of
general jurisdiction that regularly sit to entertain analogous suits, New
York is not at liberty to shut the courthouse door to federal claims that it
considers at odds with its local policy.”109 Thus, narrowly viewed,
Haywood establishes that an “analogous” state-law claim need not be
“identical” to the federal claim.110 The Court deemed actions against
police officers for damages and actions against corrections officers for
declaratory or injunctive relief (both permitted by New York law) to be
sufficiently analogous to damages actions against corrections officers
(which were not permitted). Because the state courts had jurisdiction
over the first two types of actions, it could not validly deny its courts
jurisdiction over federal claims of the third type, regardless of its reasons
for doing so.111
106

Id. at 738.
Id. at 739.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 740.
110
Id. at 740 n.6 (“While we have looked to State’s ‘common-law tort analogues’ in
deciding whether a state procedural rule is neutral . . . we have never equated ‘analogous
claims’ with ‘identical claims.’”).
111
The Court described its holding in narrow terms in responding to “the dissent’s fear that
‘no state jurisdictional rule will be upheld as constitutional.’” Id. at 741 (quoting id. at 769–
70 n.10 (Thomas, J., dissenting)). The majority stated that “[o]ur holding addresses only the
unique scheme adopted by the State of New York—a law designed to shield a particular
class of defendants (correction officers) from a particular type of liability (damages) brought
by a particular class of plaintiffs (prisoners).” Id. at 741–42.
107
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The foregoing analysis tells us that, if the state courts have
jurisdiction to grant collateral relief on other grounds, a law denying
state courts jurisdiction over collateral claims based on “new” rules
would not qualify as a “valid excuse” that would validate a state court’s
refusal to entertain a collateral claim based on a new substantive rule of
federal constitutional law. Jurisdiction to grant collateral relief of any
kind would probably be considered sufficiently analogous to the former
claims under the Haywood majority’s analysis. But it is less clear that a
law denying state courts jurisdiction over all collateral claims would fail
to qualify as a “valid excuse.”
In our view, however, the better reading of Haywood is as holding
that the Supremacy Clause requires state courts to grant collateral relief
to state prisoners whose continued incarceration contravenes a new rule
falling within a Teague exception—even if the state’s courts otherwise
lack jurisdiction over any and all collateral claims. Although the Court
did not expressly reject the idea that a state court must entertain federal
claims only if it has jurisdiction to entertain “analogous” claims under
state law, its view of what counts as an “analogous” claim was so broad
as to effectively read that restriction out of the Testa line of cases.
The Court in Haywood struck down New York’s jurisdictional
limitation barring damages actions against corrections officers not just
because its courts regularly entertained damage actions against police
officers and actions for declaratory and injunctive relief against
corrections officers, but also because “New York’s constitution vests the
state supreme courts with general original jurisdiction . . . and the
‘inviolate authority to hear and resolve all causes in law and equity.’”112
If general jurisdiction over “all causes in law” is sufficiently
“analogous” to § 1983 damage claims against corrections officials, then
general jurisdiction over causes “in equity” should be sufficiently
“analogous” to actions seeking release from incarceration brought by
prisoners whose continued incarceration has been rendered illegal by a
new rule that is retroactively applicable under Teague. Collateral review

112

Id. at 739 (quoting Pollicina v. Misericordia Hosp. Med. Ctr., 624 N.E.2d 974, 977
(N.Y. 1993)).
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of a criminal conviction is, after all, at least analogous to a suit for
prospective relief from continued incarceration.113
The Supreme Court itself recognized this analogy in Ex parte Young,
where it cited the many federal habeas cases against state custodians as
precedents supporting the jurisdiction of federal courts against state
officers for prospective relief from ongoing violations of federal
constitutional rights.114 The difference between a habeas action and an
action for injunctive relief is almost purely formal, and, as the Court
stressed in Haywood, “the Supremacy Clause cannot be evaded by
formalism.”115
Thus, although the Court in Haywood concluded that a state court
must entertain federal claims only if it has jurisdiction over “analogous”
state-law claims, it defined “analogous” very broadly. Federal claims for
damages must be entertained if the state has courts of general
jurisdiction empowered to entertain actions “at law.” It follows that
federal claims for prospective relief must be entertained as long as the
state has courts of general jurisdiction empowered to entertain suits “in
equity.” This condition of the state courts’ obligation to entertain federal
claims would appear to always be met, except perhaps when the federal

113

See generally Erica Hashimoto, Reclaiming the Equitable Heritage of Habeas, 108 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 139, 142 (2014).
114
The Court drew the analogy between the two types of actions in rejecting the claim that
the latter suits were barred by the Eleventh Amendment:
This supreme authority, which arises from the specific provisions of the Constitution
itself, is nowhere more fully illustrated than in the series of decisions under the
Federal habeas corpus statute . . . in some of which cases persons in the custody of
state officers for alleged crimes against the State have been taken from that custody
and discharged by a Federal court or judge, because the imprisonment was adjudged
to be in violation of the Federal Constitution. The right to so discharge has not been
doubted by this court, and it has never been supposed there was any suit against the
State by reason of serving the writ upon one of the officers of the State in whose
custody the person was found. . . .
It is somewhat difficult to appreciate the distinction which, while admitting that the
taking of such a person from the custody of the State by virtue of service of the writ
on the state officer in whose custody he is found is not a suit against the State, and yet
service of a writ on the Attorney General, to prevent his enforcing an unconstitutional
enactment of a State legislature, is a suit against the State.
209 U.S. 123, 167–68 (1908) (citations omitted).
115
Haywood, 556 U.S. at 742.

COPYRIGHT © 2017 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2017]

Constitutional Right to Collateral Review

935

claim is of such a novel character that it could not be described as
analogous to an action at law or in equity.
In thus effectively abandoning the requirement of an “analogous”
state law claim, the Court in Haywood was following through on the
implications of the rationale of the Testa line of cases. The Court’s
holdings in these cases were at bottom based on the proposition that, by
virtue of the Supremacy Clause, the policies underlying federal law are
not “foreign” to the states. As Justice Black wrote for the Court in Testa,
“a state court cannot ‘refuse to enforce the right arising from the law of
the United States because of conceptions of impolicy or want of wisdom
on the part of Congress . . . .’”116 “The suggestion that [an] act of
Congress is not in harmony with the policy of the State, and therefore
that the courts of the State are free to decline jurisdiction, is quite
inadmissible, because it presupposes what in legal contemplation does
not exist.”117
It follows, the Court concluded in Haywood, that “a State cannot
employ a jurisdictional rule ‘to dissociate [itself] from federal law
because of disagreement with its content. . . .’”118 As the Court put the
point in Testa, “[federal] policy is as much the policy of [the states] as if
it had emanated from its own legislature, and should be respected
accordingly in the courts of the state.”119 To that end, the Court
concluded in Haywood that a state law that denies its courts jurisdiction
over all damage claims against corrections officials, whether based on
federal or state law, reflects the state’s judgment that such officials
should not be subjected to damage liability—a policy at odds with the
federal policy reflected in § 1983. Similarly, it seems to us that a state
law that denies its courts jurisdiction to grant collateral relief to a state
prisoner, whether on federal or state grounds, reflects a policy that
criminal convictions should not be disturbed once “final.” Such a policy,
if applied to claims falling within a Teague exception, would be at odds

116

Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 393 (1947) (quoting Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v.
Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 222 (1916)).
117
Haywood, 556 U.S. at 736 (quoting Second Emp’rs’ Liab. Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 57
(1912)).
118
Id. (quoting Howlett ex rel. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 371 (1990)).
119
Testa, 330 U.S. at 392 (quoting Mondou v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R., 223
U.S. 1, 57 (1912)).
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with the federal policy articulated in Teague, as interpreted in
Montgomery. For this reason alone, it would not be a “valid excuse.”
This rationale for the Testa principle means that a jurisdictional
limitation can be a “valid excuse” for rejecting a federal claim only if it
does not turn on the content of the law over which the courts are being
denied jurisdiction. If a state denies its courts all jurisdiction over a
particular class of claim, it is likely that that the state does not recognize
the existence of such a claim as a matter of state law. If federal law
recognizes the particular class of claim, the nonexistence of the claim as
a matter of state law reflects a state policy in conflict with the relevant
federal policy.
The Court’s explanation of the basis of its holding in Testa and
Haywood therefore must mean that a state’s jurisdictional limit would
count as a “neutral” rule of administration, and thus a “valid excuse,”
only if it does not exclude a particular substantive class of cases from
the jurisdiction of the state’s courts. Examples of such neutral rules
would include a rule excluding cases in which the dispute or the parties
lack a sufficient connection with the state,120 or a rule that directed
certain types of claims to one state tribunal instead of another.121 We
discuss some possible limitations that might constitute “valid excuses”
in Part III, below. But a jurisdictional rule would not be neutral if it
reflects hostility to a particular type of claim recognized by federal law.
A state law denying its courts jurisdiction over all collateral claims
would, it seems to us, reflect hostility to the right to collateral relief
recognized by the Court in Montgomery.
b. The Crain Principle
In the present context, the Testa line of cases dovetails with a separate
line of Supremacy Clause cases establishing that state laws are invalid
insofar as they deny state courts of general jurisdiction the power to
grant remedies required by the Constitution. Indeed, the latter principle
is even more directly on point than the former. The Testa/Haywood line
of cases involved federal statutory causes of action. But the holding of
Montgomery was that state prisoners are constitutionally entitled to
120

See Missouri ex rel. S. Ry. Co. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950); Douglas v. New York,
New Haven & Hartford R.R., 279 U.S. 377 (1929).
121
See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
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collateral relief if their continued incarceration contravenes a new
substantive rule of constitutional law. The conclusion that the state
courts must entertain federal claims, subject only to neutral rules of
administration that do not reflect hostility to the right, stands on an even
stronger footing when the federal claimant seeks a constitutionally
required remedy.
The Court in Haywood framed the issue as concerning the power of
Congress, by creating a federal cause of action, to compel states to offer
a forum for the adjudication of claims over which those courts would not
otherwise have jurisdiction.122 The dissenters in Haywood similarly
understood the issue to concern the scope of congressional power to
commandeer state courts.123 When a constitutionally required remedy is
at stake, however, the reasons for insisting on the power and duty of
state courts to entertain the claim are even more powerful. After all,
when Congress creates a cause of action, it has a strong incentive to set
up an adequate judicial enforcement mechanism. If state courts are
unavailable because of a state jurisdictional limitation, Congress can,
and presumably would, invest the federal courts with jurisdiction over
such claims. Constitutionally required remedies, however, should be
available even if Congress does not support such remedies strongly
enough to give the federal courts the jurisdiction to award them.
A separate line of Supreme Court decisions supports the conclusion
that state courts are constitutionally required to entertain suits seeking
constitutionally required remedies for violations of federal law,
regardless of whether they have jurisdiction under state law to adjudicate
analogous suits. The leading case is General Oil Co. v. Crain. The
plaintiff in Crain brought suit against a Tennessee official seeking to
enjoin the enforcement of a Tennessee law it claimed was
unconstitutional. The Tennessee court dismissed the suit for lack of
jurisdiction, relying on a Tennessee statute providing
[t]hat no court in the state of Tennessee has, nor shall hereafter have,
any power, jurisdiction or authority to entertain any suit against the
122

See Haywood, 556 U.S. at 739 (“This case does not require us to decide whether
Congress may compel a State to offer a forum, otherwise unavailable under state law, to hear
suits brought pursuant to § 1983.”).
123
See id. at 770 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 928
(1997)); id. at 773 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991)).
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[s]tate, or any officer acting by the authority of the [s]tate, with a view
to reach the [s]tate, its treasury, funds, or property, and all such suits
now pending, or hereafter brought, should be dismissed . . . .124

On direct appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendant argued that the
state court’s decision rested on an adequate and independent state law
ground, namely, the state court’s lack of jurisdiction over suits against
state officials. Only Justice Harlan agreed with this argument.125 In
determining whether a state law may be relied upon as an adequate and
independent state ground precluding Supreme Court appellate review,
the Court held, “to give adequate protection to constitutional rights a
distinction must be made between valid and invalid state laws.”126 The
Tennessee law denying its courts jurisdiction over a suit to enjoin
enforcement of an unconstitutional law was, in the circumstances of the
case, invalid. “It being . . . the right of a party to be protected against a
law which violates a constitutional right . . . it is manifest that a decision
which denies such protection gives effect to the law, and the decision is
reviewable by this court.”127
Crain thus held that, if a plaintiff has a constitutional right to
injunctive relief, a state law denying its courts jurisdiction to entertain an
action seeking such relief was itself unconstitutional. The Court
concluded that the state court had an obligation to entertain a suit
seeking that constitutionally required remedy whether or not state law
authorized it to do so. Indeed, the state court had an obligation to
entertain the action and grant the requested relief even in the face of a
state statute explicitly denying it the power to do so.
*

*

*

In sum, under both the Testa and Crain lines of cases, we believe that
state courts are constitutionally obligated to entertain claims by state
prisoners seeking the collateral remedy the Court in Montgomery held to
be constitutionally required, even if they lack the jurisdiction to entertain
such claims under state law. State jurisdictional rules may validly assign
jurisdiction over such claims to specific state courts, and states may
124

Crain, 209 U.S. at 216.
Id. at 232–34 (Harlan, J., concurring).
126
Id. at 226 (majority opinion).
127
Id. at 228.
125
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impose neutral rules of administration, such as statutes of limitations, so
long as those rules do not themselves violate constitutional rights. (We
discuss the permissibility of some such rules in Part III.) But some court
in each state must be open to such claims for at least some reasonable
period.
2. Collateral Relief for State Prisoners in Federal Court
As with other constitutionally required remedies, Congress may
confer jurisdiction on the federal courts to grant collateral relief to state
prisoners, and it may even provide that the jurisdiction of the federal
courts to grant such relief shall be exclusive. Montgomery itself
confirms that Congress has not made the federal courts’ jurisdiction to
grant collateral relief to state prisoners on the basis of new rules of
federal law exclusive—a conclusion that necessarily followed from
Danforth.
The question is whether state prisoners additionally have a
constitutional right to collateral relief in federal court if their continued
incarceration contravenes a retroactively applicable new rule of federal
law. Current federal statutes arguably raise this constitutional question.
Federal statutes give the lower federal courts habeas jurisdiction over
some claims by state prisoners, but it is unclear whether these statutes
authorize the federal courts to grant habeas relief to state prisoners in
this situation. Indeed, the Court has expressly left open whether the
federal habeas statutes, as amended in AEDPA, “bar a federal habeas
petitioner from relying on a decision that came after the last state-court
adjudication on the merits, but [falls] within one of the exceptions
recognized in Teague.”128
Some scholars have argued that AEDPA is unconstitutional to the
extent it precludes federal courts from awarding collateral relief to state
prisoners incarcerated in contravention of new substantive rules of
constitutional law.129 But this conclusion runs into another widely held
view—that is, that “federal habeas corpus [is] constitutionally gratuitous
as a means of postconviction review.”130 This proposition is thought to
128

Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 39 n.* (2011).
See Zarrow & Milliken, supra note 73, at 45–46.
130
Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 55, at 1813 (citing Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch)
75, 93–94 (1807)).
129
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follow from the Madisonian Compromise, under which the Constitution
left it to Congress to determine whether to create lower federal courts in
the first place. From the premise that the lower federal courts exist only
at Congress’s pleasure, it is widely understood to follow that the
jurisdiction of such courts is entirely within Congress’s control. Thus, in
Ex parte Bollman, the Supreme Court concluded that the power of the
federal courts to grant habeas relief must be granted by written law:
“[C]ourts which are created by written law and whose jurisdiction is
defined by written law cannot transcend that jurisdiction.”131
The scope of Congress’s power to limit the jurisdiction of the federal
courts is the subject of much debate.132 This is not the place to review
the contending positions. It suffices to note that the prevailing view is
that Article III is satisfied if the Supreme Court retains jurisdiction to
review state court decisions denying a federal right.133 As discussed in
the previous section, the state courts have the power and obligation to
grant collateral relief to state prisoners based on new substantive rules of
constitutional law, and, if they fail to do so, the U.S. Supreme Court
may review and reverse their decisions. Congress may confer exclusive
jurisdiction over such claims upon the lower federal courts, but it has not
done so. Under the prevailing interpretation of Article III, if the
Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review state court decisions
adjudicating a state prisoner’s right to the remedy recognized in
Montgomery, the Constitution does not require that the lower federal
courts also be empowered to grant that remedy.
There are certainly good reasons for Congress to confer jurisdiction
on the federal courts to entertain petitions from state prisoners seeking
the remedy recognized in Montgomery. We also think there are strong
arguments for interpreting current statutes to grant the federal courts
131

8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 93.
For a review of the various positions, see Hart & Wechsler, supra note 30, at 295–341.
133
The position that some federal court must have jurisdiction to entertain federal
constitutional claims is defended by, inter alia, Akhil Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of
Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 205, 206
(1985), and Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court 1980 Term—Foreword:
Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 17, 21–22 (1981). Others argue that Article III places no limits on
Congress’s power to exclude federal issues from the jurisdiction of the federal courts. See,
e.g., Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1001, 1005–06
(1965).
132
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such jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in light of our conclusion that state
prisoners have a constitutional right to a remedy in state court for a
claim based upon a new rule of substantive constitutional law, it is
difficult to conclude that the Constitution entitles state prisoners to an
additional opportunity to enforce such a claim in the lower federal
courts.
B. Federal Prisoners
Federal prisoners of course have the same constitutional right to
collateral relief for incarcerations that contravene new rules of
substantive federal constitutional law as do state prisoners. Thus,
Montgomery raises the same question for federal prisoners that we
discussed above with respect to state prisoners: does the Constitution
require that this remedy be available in the federal courts or in the state
courts? Although the Court has never expressly resolved whether the
Teague framework (including its nonretroactivity principle) applies in
general to claims brought by federal prisoners under Section 2255,134 it
recently reaffirmed in Welch v. United States that federal prisoners are
statutorily entitled to habeas relief if their continued incarceration
contravenes a new rule falling within Teague’s “substantive”
exception.135 (In Welch, the question was whether the Court’s decision in
Johnson v. United States, invalidating part of a federal criminal statute
on Fifth Amendment vagueness grounds,136 was “substantive.”) In this
Section, we consider whether federal prisoners are constitutionally
entitled to collateral relief in federal court on this ground. We conclude
that federal prisoners are constitutionally entitled to this relief in the
state courts unless Congress has given the federal courts exclusive
jurisdiction to grant such relief.
134

See, e.g., Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342, 357 n.16 (2013) (reserving the
question whether “Teague’s bar on retroactivity does not apply when a petitioner challenges
a federal conviction, or at least does not do so when she makes a claim of ineffective
assistance”); Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 269 n.4 (2008) (reserving “whether the
Teague rule applies to cases brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255”); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.
288, 327 n.1 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court “does not address the
question whether the rule it announces today extends to claims brought by federal, as well as
state, prisoners”).
135
Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1264 (2016).
136
See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557–58 (2015).
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The case for concluding that federal courts must, as a constitutional
matter, be empowered to grant collateral post-conviction relief to
prisoners whose continued incarceration contravenes new substantive
rules of constitutional law is, in our view, stronger for federal prisoners
than for state prisoners. For state prisoners, there is no impediment to
state courts granting the constitutionally required collateral relief, and
the Supreme Court can exercise appellate review of state court decisions
denying them such relief.
The same may not be true with respect to federal prisoners. In
Tarble’s Case, the Supreme Court held that state courts lack the power
to issue writs of habeas corpus to federal jailers.137 If state courts are
constitutionally unable to grant federal prisoners the constitutionally
required collateral relief, then the Supreme Court may very well lack the
power to grant such relief on appeal from state court decisions
dismissing such applications. (If the state court correctly dismisses such
a claim for lack of jurisdiction, presumably the Supreme Court’s only
option if it reviews the decision is to affirm.) If some federal court must
have jurisdiction (either original or appellate) to grant this form of relief,
and if the state courts lack such jurisdiction as a constitutional matter,
then it must follow that, notwithstanding the Madisonian Compromise,
the Constitution confers such jurisdiction on the lower federal courts.138
In the view of some scholars, the constitutional need for review of
illegal federal detentions, and the inability of the state courts to afford
such review, explains the Court’s holding in Boumediene v. Bush that a
federal statute depriving the lower federal courts of jurisdiction over
habeas petitions from Guantánamo detainees violated the Suspension
Clause.139
We think that the reports of the death of the Madisonian Compromise
are premature. Such analyses rely at bottom on an interpretation of
137

Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 409 (1872).
Persons convicted after a criminal trial, unlike persons in executive detention, would
also be able to obtain the constitutionally required remedy through an original writ of habeas
corpus in the Supreme Court. We discuss this third avenue for obtaining the relief
contemplated by Montgomery below. See infra note 143.
139
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 792 (2008). See Mulligan, supra note 29. See also
Martin H. Redish & Curtis E. Woods, Congressional Power to Control the Jurisdicition of
Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U. Pa. L. Rev. 45, 108–
09 (1975) (drawing a similar conclusion from Tarble’s Case).
138
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Tarble’s Case as holding that state courts are constitutionally disabled
from granting habeas relief to federal prisoners. But, as the authors of
the third edition of Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the
Federal System memorably asked: “Why should the dubious tail of
Tarble’s Case wag such a large dog?”140 In other words, if a
constitutional reading of Tarble’s Case is inconsistent with the
Madisonian Compromise, wouldn’t it be far more reasonable for the
former to give way than the latter?
Indeed, a non-constitutional interpretation of Tarble’s Case is readily
available: Congress had given the lower federal courts jurisdiction to
grant habeas relief against federal officials, and the Court in Tarble’s
Case relied on the existence of such jurisdiction to reassure the reader
that its holding provided “no just ground to apprehend that the liberty of
the citizen will thereby be endangered.”141 Tarble’s Case is thus best
understood as an “implied exclusion” case, where the ouster of state
court jurisdiction was inferred from the existence of federal jurisdiction.
So construed, Tarble’s Case might well have come out differently had it
been decided at a time when there were no lower federal courts, or when
those courts lacked jurisdiction over habeas petitions like Tarble’s.142
140

Paul M. Bator et al., Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 491
(3d ed. 1988). See also id. (describing Tarble’s Case as “meandering and poorly reasoned”);
Henry L. Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489, 507
(1954) (describing Tarble’s Case as a “case of doubtful soundness” in which the Court
“discovered in the silence of Congress, or in the Constitution itself, an implied exclusion of
the state courts”).
141
Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. at 411.
142
One of us has argued in some detail that the best way to understand the relationship
between habeas corpus and the Madisonian Compromise is to appreciate the unique power
of the federal courts in and for the District of Columbia—at least until 1970—to issue
common-law writs to federal officers. See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Riddle of the One-Way
Ratchet: Habeas Corpus and the District of Columbia, 12 Green Bag 2d 71 (2008); see also
United States ex rel. Stokes v. Kendall, 26 F. Cas. 702, 713 (C.C.D.D.C. 1837) (No. 15,517)
(discussing uniqueness of D.C. Circuit), aff’d, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838). Unlike the
contemporary Article III courts, which required affirmative legislation to be vested with the
authority to issue writs of habeas corpus, the D.C. local courts exercised such power at
common law, and only lost such power when Congress affirmatively took it away in 1970.
See D.C. Code § 16-1901(b) (1970) (taking away the pre-1970 jurisdiction).
This analysis converges with the reading of Tarble’s Case offered in the text, leading us to
the same conclusion. Although the local D.C. territorial courts exercised common law
jurisdiction, they existed at all only because Congress created them. If Congress had not
created them, the residual common law jurisdiction they exercised would have been
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We think that Boumediene, too, is best understood as resting on
Congress’s implied exclusion of state jurisdiction. Upon invalidating
Congress’s limitation of the federal courts’ jurisdiction over habeas
claims by Guantánamo detainees, the Court corrected the problem by
empowering the lower federal courts to grant the constitutionally
required relief rather than authorizing the state courts to do so. We think
this (implicit) choice was based on the Court’s reasonable assumption
that Congress would have preferred that any constitutionally required
remedy for federal detainees be sought in the federal rather than the state
courts. Indeed, we think that it can safely be assumed that Congress
would have this preference for all challenges to the actions of federal
officers.
As applied to the constitutionally required collateral remedy
recognized in Montgomery, this understanding of Tarble’s Case and
Boumediene would tell us that the remedy is available as a default matter
in the state courts. But the default remedy would be the appropriate
remedy only if Congress either failed to create lower federal courts or
clearly expressed its preference that the remedy be available in the state
courts. Otherwise, as Tarble’s Case and Boumediene suggest, the federal
statutes regulating the jurisdiction of the federal courts will be construed
to authorize the lower federal courts to grant any constitutionally
required remedy against federal officials—to the exclusion of state
courts. In short, the default remedy as a constitutional matter is in the
state courts, but because Congress is highly unlikely to want state courts
to be reviewing federal detentions, the courts will apply a strong
presumption, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that the federal
courts have jurisdiction to grant any constitutionally required remedy
against federal officials.143

exercised by the Maryland (or Virginia) courts that operated in the capital region, precession. See Vladeck, supra, at 75–76 & n.13. Thus, here too, the default courts available to
provide the relief required by the Constitution, had Congress never created federal courts and
endowed them with exclusive jurisdiction, would have been state courts.
143
In the case of federal prisoners who were convicted in federal court but whose
continued incarceration contravenes new substantive rules, there is a third possibility: the
Supreme Court would be able to grant habeas relief to such prisoners under its original
habeas jurisdiction. In such cases, Supreme Court review could be regarded as appellate
rather than original for Article III purposes. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 667 n.1
(1996) (Souter, J., concurring). Thus, unlike persons in executive detention, prisoners in
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We emerge from this doctrinal thicket with two distinct—but
related—conclusions: first, for state prisoners, the constitutional right to
a post-conviction remedy for the enforcement of new rules of
substantive constitutional law is one that must be provided, in the first
instance, by state courts. Although AEDPA is best read to have
preserved the federal courts’ power to afford such relief as well, it is
clear that Congress did not intend to give the federal courts exclusive
jurisdiction to grant relief to state prisoners on the basis of new rules.
Second, for federal prisoners, although state courts are also the
Constitution’s default forum for obtaining such relief, we think the
Court’s decisions in Tarble’s Case and Boumediene are best understood
to reflect the (undoubtedly correct) assumption that Congress would
prefer any constitutionally required remedy against federal officials to
be available in the federal courts rather than the state courts. As long as
lower federal courts exist, they should be presumed to have exclusive
jurisdiction to grant any constitutionally required remedy against federal
officials. The default forum under the Constitution would become
available once more only if Congress denied the lower federal courts
jurisdiction and clearly expressed its preference that the remedy be
available in the state courts. In the absence of such a clear statement, the
Court should construe the federal habeas statute to authorize the lower
federal courts to afford the constitutionally required collateral relief
recognized in Montgomery.

custody pursuant to criminal convictions would not be constitutionally limited to review in
the state courts or the lower federal courts.
But Congress is unlikely to want such review to be available solely in the Supreme Court
rather than the lower federal courts. The Supreme Court’s time and resources are limited;
assigning to the Court the responsibility to entertain the habeas petitions of federal prisoners
raising claims based on new substantive rules of constitutional law would not be a wise
allocation of federal judicial resources. Faced with the choice of allowing such review in the
lower federal courts or in the Supreme Court, it is safe to assume that Congress would have
preferred such review to be available in the lower federal courts. The same rule of statutory
construction that justifies an interpretation of the statutes involved in Tarble’s Case and
Boumediene as permitting review in the lower federal courts in preference to the state courts
would justify an interpretation of the statutes regulating federal habeas review as permitting
the constitutionally required review of the claims of federal prisoners to occur in the lower
federal courts instead of (or in addition to) in the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
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III. THE CONTOURS OF THE
CONSTITUTIONALLY COMPELLED REMEDY
In Part I, we explained how Montgomery recognized the
constitutional basis of the first Teague v. Lane exception. In Part II, we
demonstrated why that result, when taken together with the Supreme
Court’s Supremacy Clause jurisprudence, compels the conclusion that
state and federal prisoners alike have a constitutional right to a collateral
post-conviction remedy where, based upon new substantive rules of
constitutional law, their continued incarceration is no longer lawful. In
this Part, we turn to some of the broader implications of Montgomery’s
recognition of a constitutionally required collateral remedy. Because the
takeaway from Parts I and II is potentially so momentous, it is
impossible to sketch out all of the potential implications that arise from
reading Montgomery together with the Supreme Court’s Supremacy
Clause jurisprudence. Instead, our effort here is to identify and offer
some preliminary thoughts about what we see as some of the more
important key issues.
A. The Types of Claims for Which Prisoners Are Entitled to Collateral
Relief
As Part I demonstrated, the Court in Montgomery held that prisoners
are entitled to collateral relief based on new substantive rules of
constitutional law. The core case is one that seeks collateral relief based
on a new rule that “places ‘certain kinds of primary, private individual
conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to
proscribe.’”144 An example would be the new rule recognized by the
Supreme Court’s decision in Texas v. Johnson, holding that the First
Amendment prohibits punishment for burning the American flag.145 In
addition, the Court has held that the Teague exception for new
substantive rules applies to new “rules prohibiting a certain category of
punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or
offense.”146 Montgomery involved a new substantive rule of this type.
144

Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
145
491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989).
146
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989).
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The Court in Teague recognized a second category of new rules
exempt from the bar on retroactive application: “watershed” procedural
rules, defined as “those new procedures without which the likelihood of
an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.”147 The Court in Teague
expressed the belief that it was “unlikely that many such components of
basic due process have yet to emerge.”148 And, indeed, the Court has yet
to recognize a new procedural rule as falling within this category. If the
Justices should ever identify a new rule falling into this category, we
believe the Montgomery holding would extend to such rules as well.
After all, they rest on the same basic premise from Justice Harlan’s
Desist and Mackey opinions—that the new rule vitiates the basis for the
prisoner’s incarceration.
With respect to federal prisoners, the “substantive” category applies
to new decisions interpreting criminal statutes in a way that narrows the
range of conduct the statute makes criminal. For example, the Court in
Bousley v. United States149 held that its earlier decision in Bailey
v. United States,150 interpreting the term “use” in the law making it a
crime to use a firearm in certain circumstances, was retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review. Persons who are not guilty of
the offense as narrowed by the new decision are entitled to collateral
relief.
With respect to state prisoners, a similar question arises as to whether
they are entitled to collateral relief on the basis of new substantive rules
of state law. In other words, does the federal Constitution entitle them to
collateral relief if the state’s highest court subsequently rules that the
statute under which the prisoner was convicted contravenes the state
constitution or does not criminalize the conduct the prisoner was found
to have committed? Examination of this question helps shed light on the
basis and scope of the Court’s holding in Montgomery. Montgomery
establishes that the retroactivity of new substantive rules of federal law
is based on the federal Constitution, but the Court did not explain which
provision of the Constitution requires such retroactive application. Does
the federal Constitution also require the retroactive application of new
147

Teague, 489 U.S. at 313.
Id.
149
523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998).
150
516 U.S. 137, 144 (1995).
148
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substantive rules of state law, or is the retroactivity of such rules purely
a matter of state law?
The issue was teed up but ultimately avoided in Fiore v. White.151
Petitioner William Fiore was convicted of violating a Pennsylvania
statute making it a crime to operate a hazardous waste facility without a
permit. After Fiore’s conviction became final, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court reviewed the conviction of Fiore’s business partner,
David Scarpone, who was convicted of performing the same acts at the
same time. The state court held that the statute did not apply to the
conduct. Nevertheless, the Pennsylvania courts refused to afford Fiore
collateral relief. Fiore then sought federal habeas relief, arguing that
failure to give him the benefit of the new decision of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court violated the Due Process Clause. The district court
granted the writ, but the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the “state
courts are under no [federal] constitutional obligation to apply their
decisions retroactively.”152 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari
but, before reaching the merits, asked the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
to clarify whether its decision in the Scarpone case articulated a new
rule of law or instead correctly stated the law as it existed at the time of
Fiore’s conviction.153 The Pennsylvania court responded that its earlier
decision had not announced a new rule of law, and the U.S. Supreme
Court held that Fiore was entitled to habeas relief under Jackson v.
Virginia,154 which establishes that a conviction violates the Due Process
Clause if not supported by evidence establishing the defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.155
Because the Pennsylvania court had clarified that its later decision
was retroactively applicable as a matter of state law, the Supreme Court
did not have to decide whether the U.S. Constitution requires state
courts to give retroactive effect to judicial decisions on substantive
questions of state law. We think the answer to that question turns on the
source and scope of the constitutional right the Court recognized in
Teague, and hence of the remedy recognized in Montgomery.
151

531 U.S. 225, 226 (2001).
Fiore v. White, 149 F.3d 221, 222 (3d Cir. 1998).
153
Fiore v. White, 528 U.S. 23, 25 (1999).
154
443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979).
155
See Fiore, 531 U.S. at 228–29.
152
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On our view, the Teague exception for new substantive rules of
constitutional law rests at bottom on the Court’s understanding of the
nature of the role of the federal courts in interpreting constitutional or
statutory provisions addressing primary conduct. There are (at least) two
possible ways to understand the “retroactive” effect of new judicial
interpretations of substantive law. The first approach is to understand
such decisions as telling us that the law has always meant what the
Court now says it means. Thus, the prior decisions interpreting the
provision differently and denying the prisoner relief were erroneous
from the start. This view seems most consistent with the Court’s
description of these new rules as having “retroactive” effect; applying
the new rule “retroactively” is correcting an historical error, and not
simply rendering a forward-looking judgment.
Alternatively, we might understand a court’s decision adopting a new
interpretation as placing new limits on the power of government to
impose punishment for certain types of conduct. On this view, the new
decision does not call into question the correctness of the earlier judicial
decision when rendered (or the state’s incarceration of the prisoner up
until the time the new decision was rendered). But the new interpretation
does deny the state the power to continue to punish the prisoner for
having performed the acts he was found to have performed. On this
second understanding of the effect of a new judicial decision, the court
awarding collateral relief is not really giving the new interpretation
“retroactive” effect; it is merely recognizing that the state no longer
possesses the power to punish the prisoner. So construed, the Teague
exception gives prospective effect to the new interpretation by ordering
the prisoner’s release from what is, from that point forward, illegal
detention. That the Court understands the effect of a new interpretation
of substantive federal law in this second way is suggested by its
description of its holding as being based on the idea that the state “may
not constitutionally insist that a prisoner remain in jail,”156 as well as its
statement that, “when a State enforces a proscription or penalty barred
by the Constitution, the resulting conviction or sentence is, by definition,
unlawful.”157

156
157

Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 731 (2016) (emphasis added).
Id. at 729–30 (emphasis added).
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The second rationale for entitling the prisoner to the benefit of the
new interpretation is more plausible for new constitutional decisions
than for new interpretations narrowing the substantive scope of criminal
statutes. With respect to new constitutional interpretations, Montgomery
may reflect the Court’s recognition that there is a fundamental
unfairness, perhaps of due process ramifications, in continuing to
incarcerate an individual for conduct that the state no longer possesses
the power to proscribe. With respect to new interpretations narrowing
the scope of a federal statute, however, the second rationale would
appear to require the conclusion that a prisoner is also constitutionally
entitled to the benefit of the subsequent repeal of the statute she was
convicted of violating. Although continuing to incarcerate someone for
violating a statute that has subsequently been repealed may also be
thought to be unfair, it has never been thought to be unconstitutional.158
Because the Court appears to regard the holding of Bousley as merely a
straightforward application of the rule established in Teague, we think
the first of the two approaches described above is the most persuasive
conceptualization of the first Teague exception.
If Montgomery is based on the idea that new judicial interpretations of
substantive federal law clarify what the substantive law has always
meant, then its applicability to new state court interpretations of state
law depends on whether the federal Constitution requires states to regard
their judiciaries’ new interpretations of state laws in the same way. If
any provision of the federal Constitution addresses how states must
understand their courts’ novel interpretations of state law, presumably it
is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Due
Process Clause undoubtedly imposes some outer limits in this context.
For example, the Due Process Clause prohibits arbitrariness in judicial
decision-making. This may mean, for example, that a state cannot
validly give one defendant the benefit of a new constitutional or
statutory interpretation yet deny the benefit of the new interpretation to
someone who jointly committed the crime but was tried separately.159
158
See Comment, Today’s Law and Yesterday’s Crime: Retroactive Application of
Ameliorative Criminal Legislation, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 120, 145 (1972) (“No matter what the
nature of the change, ameliorative legislation has never been held to apply to finalized
convictions.”).
159
Thus, there would have been a strong argument that failure to give Fiore the benefit of
the new rule recognized in Scarpone’s case would have violated the Due Process Clause.
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We doubt, however, that the Due Process Clause imposes on the
states the particular conception of the judicial role in interpreting
substantive law that underlies the Teague and Montgomery holdings.
Indeed, the role of the state courts with respect to state law differs
significantly from the role of the federal courts with respect to federal
law. Of particular relevance here, the state courts as a matter of course
engage openly and unapologetically in judicial law-making—for
example, when they develop their state’s common law. The federal
courts’ authority to play a law-making role is much more constrained
and exceptional. We thus think it likely that the states can, consistently
with the Due Process Clause, conceptualize their courts’ novel
interpretations of their constitutions or statutes as acts of law-making
applicable only to primary conduct occurring after the judicial decision
was rendered. The Due Process Clause limits the states’ freedom not to
extend the benefits of a new rule to persons convicted earlier in certain
contexts (such as, we think, on the facts of Fiore v. White),160 but we
doubt that the Clause imposes a general requirement on the states to give
retroactive effect to new judicial interpretations of state law, even when
the new interpretation bears on the permissibility of primary individual
conduct.
Of course, a state is free to understand judicial decisions adopting
new interpretations of state law as the Court in Teague and Montgomery
understood judicial decisions adopting new interpretations of the
substantive provisions of the federal Constitution. If a state does regard
the new judicial interpretations in this way, then Fiore tells us that the
Due Process Clause requires the state courts to apply those
interpretations to persons convicted before the interpretations were
rendered. But whether new judicial interpretations of substantive law are
retroactively applicable is ordinarily a question of state law not
reviewable in federal courts.
B. When Does the Right Accrue?
The petitioners in both Montgomery and Welch based their (ultimately
successful) claims on new decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court that the
petitioners in both cases claimed were substantive, although the Court

160

See supra text accompanying note 159.
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had not yet so held with regard to either. This tells us that the right to
collateral relief accrues, at the latest, when the Supreme Court
recognizes a new rule that is retroactively applicable on collateral review
(even if, as in both cases, it was not self-evident that the new rule so
qualifies). There is no need to await a Supreme Court decision holding
that the new rule is retroactively applicable.
In Teague, the Court held that a prisoner raising a substantive claim
may ask the habeas court to recognize the substantive right for the first
time. Thus, the petitioner in Penry v. Lynaugh brought a federal habeas
petition raising the claim that the Constitution prohibits imposition of
the death penalty on persons with mental disabilities.161 The Court held
that this claim fell within the first Teague exception and could thus be
raised on collateral review.162 However, the Court went on to reject the
claim on the merits.163 (The Court reversed itself on the latter point in
Atkins v. Virginia.164)
After AEDPA, a prisoner would be able to maintain a first federal
habeas petition seeking the initial recognition of a new substantive rule
if the claim was not “adjudicated on the merits in state court.”165 As
discussed in Part II, it is unclear whether the habeas statute as amended
by AEDPA permits claims based on new rules of any kind if the claim
was adjudicated on the merits in state court. If AEDPA were read to
permit claims based upon new rules falling within a Teague exception,
as we suggest above, it is unclear whether the petitioner would be able to
ask the habeas court to recognize that right for the first time or would be
limited to enforcing on habeas a new rule that has already been
recognized by the Supreme Court. At best, a state prisoner would be able
to seek initial recognition of a new rule only in his first federal habeas
petition, and only if the petition was brought within one year of when
the conviction became final. The statute of limitations trigger for “new
rules” begins to run on “the date on which the constitutional right

161

492 U.S. 302, 307 (1989).
Id. at 329–30.
163
Id. at 330–40.
164
536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
165
Such a claim would now have to be brought in the petitioner’s first federal habeas
petition, and it would have to be brought within one year of the date on which the conviction
became final.
162
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asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review.”166 And the authorization for
raising a claim in a second or successive petition applies only if “the
claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to
cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously
unavailable.”167 Thus, claims based on new substantive rules may not be
raised more than one year after the conviction became final, and may not
be raised in a second or successive petition if the new rule has not
already been recognized (and “made retroactive”) by the Supreme
Court.
As to collateral claims raised in state court, does Montgomery
establish that prisoners have the right to seek initial recognition of a
right falling within the Teague exceptions? We think not. State courts
must, of course, entertain at trial all properly raised federal claims or
defenses (both substantive and procedural). If the claim was rejected by
the court at trial and on direct appeals, the defendant can seek review in
the Supreme Court. States may permit such claims to be raised again in
collateral proceedings. But, except in unusual circumstances (such as
when the claim could not have been raised earlier), we do not think the
Constitution requires the states to afford state prisoners an opportunity to
relitigate the substantive claim in collateral proceedings. Just as state
rules of claim and issue preclusion relegate civil litigants to one shot at
adjudicating their claims and defenses, states can validly limit criminal
defendants to a single opportunity to raise even substantive
constitutional claims. A contrary conclusion would permit endless
relitigation of claims that were properly rejected under existing federal
precedents.
Allowing a state prisoner to seek initial recognition of a new
substantive rule on federal habeas is justified by the need to afford such
prisoners at least one realistic shot at a federal forum in which to raise
the claim. (As noted, the Supreme Court may directly review via
certiorari the state courts’ denial of federal claims at trial, but the Court
grants review of very few certiorari petitions. State prisoners cannot be
said to have a realistic shot at Supreme Court review of their claims via
166
167

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C) (2012).
Id. § 2244(b)(2)(A).
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certiorari.) But all state prisoners had a realistic opportunity—indeed, a
right—to have their federal claims adjudicated in the state courts at their
trials and direct appeals. The Constitution does not give them a right to a
second opportunity in the state courts.
The situation is different after the Supreme Court has rendered a new
substantive decision establishing the validity of the petitioner’s claim for
the first time. Thus, we think that the right recognized in Montgomery is
a right to obtain collateral relief in state court for claims based on new
substantive rules that have been definitively recognized for the first time
by the Supreme Court after the petitioner’s conviction became final. The
holding thus rests on the courts’ understanding of the effect of Supreme
Court decisions recognizing new substantive rules.
C. Procedural Limitations
As discussed in Part II, the states may impose neutral procedural
limitations on the enforcement of federal rights in state court. Such
procedural rules are valid if they satisfy the requirements of the Due
Process Clause as well as the Supremacy Clause’s nondiscrimination
principle. Federal procedural rules, too, must satisfy the Due Process
Clause. Federal jurisdictional limits that might otherwise raise
constitutional questions might be deemed valid to the extent federal
collateral relief is understood to be constitutionally optional. With
respect to federal prisoners, however, the courts properly presume that
Congress would prefer collateral review to take place in federal rather
than state courts. Thus, courts may (and should) assume that, rather than
rely on the state courts to provide federal prisoners the collateral relief
required by the Constitution, Congress would prefer that the federal
habeas statute be construed to authorize the federal courts to afford
federal prisoners the procedures required by the Due Process Clause.
1. Statutes of Limitations
A statute of limitations is an example of such a procedural limitation.
As noted, the statute of limitations imposed by AEDPA, for both state
and federal prisoners seeking federal habeas relief, requires that habeas
claims be raised within one year of the latest of four dates. One of the
triggering events is the “the date on which the constitutional right
asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has
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been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review.”168 A statute of limitations
satisfies Due Process if it gives the prisoner “a reasonable opportunity to
have the issue as to the claimed right heard and determined.”169 A statute
that gives the prisoner one year from the time the right accrues to bring a
claim based on a new substantive rule of constitutional law would
appear to satisfy this standard.
As long as it is applied in a nondiscriminatory manner, and affords
the petitioner enough time, a state statute of limitations can permissibly
be applied to petitions seeking state collateral review on the basis of new
substantive rules. Because of the nature of a Montgomery claim,
however, the Constitution requires that any state statute of limitations
must, like AEDPA’s, begin to run anew upon the Supreme Court’s
initial recognition of the new rule (which, as we discussed above, is
when the right to collateral relief recognized in Montgomery necessarily
accrues).
2. Successive Petitions
AEDPA also placed stringent new limits on the ability of state and
federal prisoners to present second or successive federal habeas
petitions. These limits potentially present two significant constitutional
problems after Montgomery. As discussed below, the courts appear to
have avoided the first problem through statutory interpretation, but the
other problem remains significant.
AEDPA permits the filing of a second or successive federal habeas
petition170 (by state or federal prisoners) only if, as relevant here, “the
claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to
cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously
unavailable.”171 But the petitioner would be able to include only claims
that were not included in a prior petition, as AEDPA provides
168

Id. § 2244(d)(1)(C).
Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 93 (1955) (quoting Parker v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 571,
574 (1948)).
170
With regard to second or successive petitions, § 2255 incorporates the same
requirements as § 2244. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (“A second or successive motion must be
certified as provided in section 2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals . . . .”).
171
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A) (2012).
169
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categorically that “[a] claim presented in a second or successive habeas
corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior
application shall be dismissed.”172 Depending on how one defines a
“claim,” this provision could have perverse results. Consider a prisoner
convicted of burning the American flag before the Court’s decision in
Texas v. Johnson establishing that this conduct is protected by the First
Amendment.173 If his “claim” for purposes of determining the
permissibility of a second or successive petition is a “First Amendment”
claim, he would be barred from seeking collateral relief after the Texas
v. Johnson decision if he had unsuccessfully raised a First Amendment
claim in his first federal habeas petition, but not if he omitted the claim
from his earlier petition. Such a regime would perversely disadvantage
the petitioner who had the diligence and foresight to raise the claim
earlier, only to have it dismissed under then-prevailing law.
In cases brought by federal prisoners, the courts have (properly, in our
view) avoided this problem by (implicitly) defining a “claim” narrowly
for purposes of determining the permissibility of a second or successive
petition. Thus, none of the cases leading up to Welch were rejected on
the ground that the petitioners had already raised “vagueness”
challenges prior to the Supreme Court’s articulation of the underlying
new rule.174 The courts have thus apparently construed the term “claim”
narrowly so that, in our hypothetical above, the relevant “claim” would
be a “Texas v. Johnson” claim, rather than a “First Amendment” claim.
Obviously, the petitioner could not have raised a “Texas v. Johnson
claim” before the Texas v. Johnson decision was handed down, so
Section 2244 would not bar him from raising the claim now in a second
or successive petition. The courts have, in our view, properly adopted
this interpretation to avoid perverse results. After Montgomery, we think
this interpretation is further justified by the need to avoid a significant
constitutional question. For the same reasons, in our view, Montgomery
requires state courts to entertain a petition raising a claim after the

172

Id. § 2244(b)(1).
491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989).
174
In Welch itself, the petitioner had anticipated the Johnson v. United States vagueness
holding by making that argument initially. The fact that it was rejected by the Eleventh
Circuit prior to the decision in Johnson did not preclude him from raising it anew once
Johnson, the new rule, was decided.
173
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Supreme Court’s recognition of the new substantive rule even if the
petitioner had unsuccessfully raised the claim earlier.175
The second problem with the AEDPA rule on second or successive
petitions unfortunately remains significant. According to AEDPA’s text,
a prisoner’s ability to raise a claim based on a new rule in a second or
successive petition depends not just on the Supreme Court’s recognition
of a right that is retroactively applicable on collateral review, but in
addition on the Supreme Court also having held specifically that this
new rule is retroactively applicable on collateral review. In Tyler v.
Cain, Justice O’Connor’s controlling concurring opinion made clear that
a “new” rule has been “made retroactive on collateral review by the
Supreme Court” if the retroactivity of the new rule follows “by strict
logical necessity” from the Court’s prior decisions establishing when a
new rule is retroactively applicable.176 Thus, if a new rule is clearly
substantive, it will have been “made retroactive of collateral review by
the Supreme Court” at the moment the Court recognizes the new rule
(thanks to prior decisions clearly holding that all “substantive” rules are
retroactive). But as Welch demonstrates, it will not always be clear
whether a new rule qualifies as “substantive” or is, instead, procedural,
and thus unenforceable through collateral post-conviction review unless
it falls within the second Teague exception. In such cases, a prisoner
may be able to raise the claim in a second federal habeas petition only
after the Supreme Court has held in a later case that the new rule is, in
fact, retroactively applicable. And, because the one-year statute of
limitations begins to run when the Supreme Court initially recognizes
the new rule, the prisoner will be able to raise his claim in a second or
successive petition only if the Court “makes” the new rule retroactive (in
a different case) within a year of the Court’s initial announcement of the
new rule. If the Court does not render its decision confirming the
retroactivity of the new rule within a year of its initial decision
recognizing the new rule, prisoners will find themselves with zero time
to seek federal habeas relief.
175
Thus, for example, we disagree with decisions such as that of the Oregon Court of
Appeals in Cunio v. Premo, 395 P.3d 25 (Or. App. 2017), which concluded that a claim
seeking to enforce Miller v. Alabama retroactively in a state post-conviction proceeding was
barred by the state’s rule against successive post-conviction petitions. An appeal in Cunio is
currently pending before the Oregon Supreme Court.
176
Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 670 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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With respect to federal prisoners, we think Montgomery now renders
this regime constitutionally problematic (if it wasn’t already).177
Montgomery establishes that federal prisoners have a constitutional right
to collateral relief if their continued incarceration contravenes a new
substantive rule of constitutional law (or, we think, a new rule falling
within the second Teague exception). After Montgomery, a federal
prisoner would have a good argument that AEDPA’s statute of
limitations violates the Due Process Clause to the extent it denies him
relief because the new rule was not “made retroactive by the Supreme
Court” until more than a year after it was initially recognized by the
Court. Under the Due Process Clause, prisoners must have “a reasonable
opportunity to have the issue as to the claimed right heard and
determined,”178 yet, through the interaction of AEDPA’s statute of
limitations and its restriction on second or successive petitions, a federal
prisoner might find himself with zero time to raise his claim for
collateral relief. Because Congress can be presumed to have preferred
that a constitutionally required remedy against federal officials be
sought in the federal courts, AEDPA’s statute of limitations should be
construed in a way that provides federal prisoners a constitutionally
adequate amount of time to seek the constitutionally required remedy
recognized in Montgomery.
With respect to state prisoners seeking habeas relief in federal court,
AEDPA’s regime for second or successive petitions is constitutionally
valid (although senseless and harsh) only because federal habeas relief is
constitutionally optional to begin with. There is no basis in Teague itself
for concluding that the right to collateral relief is triggered only after a
second Supreme Court decision holding the new rule falls within a
Teague exception. (Indeed, as discussed above, Teague permits
prisoners to seek initial recognition of new rules falling within the two
exceptions via federal habeas.) Thus, we think that state courts are
required to provide collateral review of claims based on new rules
falling within a Teague exception upon the Supreme Court’s recognition
of the right, without awaiting a second holding that the rule falls within a
177

See Vladeck, supra note 58 (describing the constitutional and practical difficulties
posed by AEDPA’s constraints on enforcing new rules through second or successive
petitions).
178
Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 93 (1955) (quoting Parker v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 571,
574 (1948)).
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Teague exception. In our view, Montgomery requires the states to waive
any limit on second and successive petitions that would preclude or
unduly burden a prisoner’s right to seek collateral relief on the basis of a
new substantive rule of federal constitutional law after the Supreme
Court has announced the new rule. Indeed, in light of the obstacles
imposed by AEDPA to raising such a claim even in a first federal habeas
petition, we think review of a state court’s denial of a petition for
collateral review on the ground that a newly recognized rule is not
applicable on collateral review offers the surest route to a Supreme
Court holding that the new rule is retroactively applicable on collateral
review.179 And, if the state has a statute of limitations for collateral
relief, a state prisoner would be well advised to pursue state collateral
relief instead of federal habeas, lest his time for filing a state petition
expire while he is seeking federal review.
3. Procedural Defaults
A more difficult question is whether the state can deem the claim
procedurally defaulted if the petitioner did not raise the claim at his trial
or in his direct appeals, as most states do. Even if the claim is not
supported by Supreme Court precedents directly on point, failure to raise
a contemporaneous objection results in forfeiture of the claim as a
matter of course. After Montgomery, does the Constitution require states
to waive procedural defaults based on failure to contemporaneously
object if the claim had not been recognized by the Supreme Court at the
time of the trial?
The Supreme Court has recognized that the novelty of the claim may
be “cause” that would excuse a failure to contemporaneously object
under certain circumstances. The novelty of the claim will constitute
“cause” if the petitioner at the time of trial lacked the tools with which to
construct the argument.180 In other words, if the Supreme Court’s
179
This would particularly be the case if, as some have argued, the Court’s holding in
Tyler (with respect to claims falling within the second Teague exception) also applies to
AEDPA’s statute of limitations trigger, under which the statute begins to run on “the date on
which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the
right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to
cases on collateral review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C) (2012). See Appeals and Writs in
Criminal Cases § 15.2 (Stella Lee ed., 3d ed. 2016 update).
180
See Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1984); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 131 (1982).
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recognition of the right was foreshadowed by earlier decisions, the
petitioner will be expected to have anticipated the Court’s recognition of
the right. As a practical matter, this standard means that the default will
not be excused for prisoners convicted shortly before the Court’s
recognition of the new rule, as the Court’s recognition of the new rule
will usually be an incremental step in the evolution of constitutional
doctrine. But a person convicted well before the recognition of the new
rule will often have “cause” for his failure to raise the claim, as the
precedents at that time of his trial will typically not have evolved to the
point that he will have had the “tools with which to construct” the claim.
The Court’s decisions defining “cause” have been framed as a basis
for permitting habeas review in the federal courts despite a state
procedural default.181 The Court has not said that the state courts
themselves are required to excuse procedural defaults because of the
novelty of the claim. But, as noted above, the conventional view before
Montgomery was that the state courts were not required to afford state
prisoners collateral review at all. Now that states are required to provide
collateral relief for new substantive rules, the question arises whether the
“cause” standard articulated by the Court is also applicable in the state
courts. There would appear to be a strong case to be made that the
Court’s standard for regarding the novelty of a new rule to be “cause”
for excusing a procedural default is applicable to the state courts as a
constitutional matter.
On the other hand, AEDPA might be read to absolve the state courts
of the obligation to consider claims that were procedurally defaulted
because they were not raised at trial. As discussed above, AEDPA
entitles state prisoners to habeas relief based on new substantive rules
under the pre-AEDPA standard if the claim was not adjudicated on the
merits in state court. If the claim was not raised by the petitioner at trial
or direct appeals, then the claim will presumably not have been
adjudicated on the merits in state court. If the petitioner raises the claim
in a federal habeas petition after the Supreme Court’s initial recognition
of the right, the federal habeas court will entertain the claim, despite the
procedural default, if the petitioner can show “cause.” And he will be
able to show cause if he lacked the tools with which to construct the
argument. Thus, federal habeas relief will be available in precisely those
181

See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86 (1977).
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cases in which the state courts would be required to entertain the claim if
the “cause” standard were imposed on the state courts. If Montgomery
requires that collateral relief be available in either state or federal courts,
then the availability of federal habeas relief in precisely those cases that
the state would regard as procedurally defaulted would obviate the
question of the state’s obligation to excuse the default.
We think the better reading of AEDPA is as offering state prisoners
an additional forum for adjudicating their otherwise defaulted claims
based on retroactively applicable new rules. To interpret AEDPA as
giving the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over state prisoners’
otherwise defaulted collateral claims based on new substantive rules of
constitutional law would run counter to the overall thrust of AEDPA,
which is to give the state courts the first-line responsibility for enforcing
the federal rights of state prisoners.182 The state courts have a duty under
Montgomery to provide collateral review of state prisoners’ claims based
on new substantive rules, and, in so doing, we think they must waive
any procedural default based on the prisoner’s failure to raise the claim
before the Supreme Court definitively recognized it, at least if the
prisoner lacked the tools with which to construct the argument at the
time of his trial.
CONCLUSION
Many of the implications of reading Montgomery together with the
Supreme Court’s Supremacy Clause jurisprudence will have to be
fleshed out over time, as new cases come up testing its implications.
This Article is meant to open—but not close—the discussion of the farreaching consequences Montgomery is likely to have on the scope and
availability of collateral post-conviction relief in both state and federal
courts, especially for claims that the prisoner’s continued detention is
unlawful based upon new rules of constitutional law.
But Montgomery may prove to be even more important outside the
specific context of retroactivity, for it is the first time the Supreme Court
has ever held that at least some aspect of collateral post-conviction
review is constitutionally required. In the process, Montgomery
182
See, e.g., Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 182 (2011) (noting that AEDPA intended
to “channel prisoners’ claims first to the state courts” and “leaves primary responsibility with
the state courts”).
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necessarily opens the door to a reassessment of any number of features
of collateral post-conviction review, most of which have historically
been thought to be nothing more than the product of legislative grace.
We have argued in this Article that, properly understood, the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Montgomery constitutionalized the Teague
exceptions—and recognizes a constitutional right to a collateral postconviction remedy in such cases for state and federal prisoners alike. By
holding that some aspects of post-conviction habeas are constitutionally
grounded (and their remedies constitutionally compelled), the
Montgomery decision potentially raises far-reaching questions about
whether other aspects of habeas post-conviction review have
constitutional underpinnings as well.

